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# OPERATIONS

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Preface

ADRP 3-0 supports land operations doctrine established in ADP 3-0, Operations, and is supported by FM 3-0, Operations. This publication expands the overarching guidance on unified land operations. It accounts for the uncertainty of operations and recognizes that a military operation is a human undertaking. It constitutes the Army’s view of how to conduct prompt and sustained operations on land and sets the foundation for developing other principles, tactics, techniques, and procedures detailed in subordinate doctrine publications. ADP 3-0 and ADRP 3-0 articulate the Army’s operational concept for unified land operations. Additionally, this publication is the foundation for training and Army education system curricula on unified land operations.

The principal audience for ADRP 3-0 is all members of the profession of arms. Commanders and staffs of Army headquarters serving as joint task force or multinational headquarters should also refer to applicable joint or multinational doctrine concerning the range of military operations and joint or multinational forces. Trainers and educators throughout the Army will use this publication as well.

Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure that their decisions and actions comply with applicable United States, international, and in some cases host-nation laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels ensure that their Service members operate in accordance with the law of war and the rules of engagement. (See FM 27-10.)

ADRP 3-0 uses joint terms where applicable. Selected joint and Army terms and definitions appear in both the glossary and the text. Terms for which ADRP 3-0 is the proponent publication (the authority) are marked with an asterisk (*) in the glossary. Definitions for which ADRP 3-0 is the proponent publication are boldfaced in the text. For other definitions shown in the text, the term is italicized and the number of the proponent publication follows the definition.

ADRP 3-0 applies to the Active Army, Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated.

The proponent of ADRP 3-0 is the United States Army Combined Arms Center. The preparing agency is the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, United States Army Combined Arms Center. Send comments and recommendations on a DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) to Commander, United States Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, ATTN: ATZL-MCD (ADRP 3-0), 300 McPherson Avenue, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2337; by e-mail to usarmy.leavenworth.mccoe.mbx.cadd-org-mailbox@mail.mil; or submit an electronic DA Form 2028.
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Introduction

An operation is a sequence of tactical actions with a common purpose or unifying theme. ADRP 3-0 discusses operations by expanding on the foundations, tenets, and doctrine of unified land operations found in ADP 3-0. ADRP 3-0 provides a common perspective on the nature of warfare and a common reference for solving military problems. ADRP 3-0 describes how the Army conducts operations as a unified action partner by establishing the Army’s operational concept—a fundamental statement that frames how Army forces, operating as part of a joint force, conduct operations (ADP 1-01). The Army’s operational concept of unified land operations—including its principles, tenets, and operational structure—serves as the basic framework for all operations across the conflict continuum. It is the core of Army doctrine and guides how Army forces contribute to unified action. As with each previous version of operations publications, ADRP 3-0 shapes all Army doctrine and influences the Army’s organization, training, material, leadership, and education. (See introductory figure on page vi for the ADRP 3-0 logic chart.)

ADRP 3-0 contains numerous changes to the November 2016 version, the most significant of which are updates necessary to align with FM 3-0, Operations. ADRP 3-0 modifies the definition of unified land operations to account for the consolidation of gains. ADRP 3-0 adds the concept of a consolidation area to the operational framework. Additional changes include a discussion of peer threats, positions of relative advantage, multi-domain considerations, and the consolidation of gains as an Army strategic role. These all expand upon unified land operations.

ADRP 3-0 employs information, such as principles and tenets, as a means of highlighting key aspects of doctrine. Where lists are employed, a narrative discussion follows to provide details on the subject. They serve as guidelines or tools for readers to more easily remember important doctrinal terms. However, there remains a need to study doctrine in detail and consider how terms are applied to operations.

ADRP 3-0 modifies key topics and updates terminology and concepts as necessary. These topics include the discussion of an operational environment and the operational and mission variables, as well as discussions of unified action, law of land warfare, and combat power. Mission command remains both a philosophy of command and a warfighting function. ADRP 3-0 maintains combined arms as the application of arms that multiplies Army forces’ effectiveness in all operations. However, ADRP 3-0 expands combined arms to include joint and multinational assets as integral to combined arms and discusses how the Army conducts these operations across multiple domains. ADRP 3-0 also changes the primary staff task of synchronize information-related capabilities to conduct information operations. For detailed information on specific tactics and procedures, see FM 3-0.

ADRP 3-0 contains five chapters:

Chapter 1 discusses military operations. It describes the variables that shape the nature of an operational environment and affect outcomes. The chapter then discusses unified action and joint operations as well as land operations. Finally, this chapter discusses the importance of training to gain skill in land warfare.

Chapter 2 discusses the application of operational art. It discusses how commanders should consider defeat and stability mechanisms when developing an operational approach. It then discusses the elements of operational art and their meanings to Army forces.

Chapter 3 discusses the Army’s operational concept of unified land operations. It discusses how commanders apply landpower as part of unified action to defeat the enemy on land and establish conditions that achieve the joint force commander’s end state. Chapter 3 discusses the principles of unified land operations and the tenets of unified land operations.

Chapter 4 discusses the operations structure commanders use to array forces and conduct operations. It includes a discussion on the addition of a consolidation area to the operational framework. It concludes with a discussion on the operational framework used in the conduct of unified land operations.
Chapter 5 discusses combat power. It opens with a discussion of the elements of combat power. It then discusses the six warfighting functions used to generate combat power and access joint and multinational capabilities. Lastly, it discusses how Army forces organize combat power through force tailoring, task organization, and mutual support.

**Unified Action**

The synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort. (JP 1)

The conduct of joint operations...

**Unified Land Operations**

*(The Army’s Operational Concept)*

Simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability or defense support of civil authorities tasks to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative to shape the operational environment, prevent conflict, consolidate gains, and win our nation’s wars as part of unified action.

**Decisive Action**

Offensive
Defensive
Stability
DSCA (Tasks)

**Mission Command** *(Philosophy)*

**Operational Environment**

human context
land operations
PMESII-PT
METT-TC

To cope with an operational environment, Army forces conduct

**Operational Art**

End state and conditions
Center of gravity
Decisive points
Lines of operations and lines of effort
Operational reach
Basing
Tempo
Phasing and transitions
Culmination
Risk

**Operations Process**

Plan
- Army design methodology
- MDMP
- Troop loading procedures
Prepare
- Execute
Assess

**Operations Structure**

Provide a broad process for conducting operations
Provide basic options for visualizing and describing operations
Provide an intellectual organization for common critical tasks

**Develop operations characterized by**

Simultaneity
Depth
Synchronization
Flexibility

Tenets

Mission command
Develop the situation through action
Combined arms
Adherence to law of war
Establish and maintain security
Create multiple dilemmas for the enemy

Principles

Mission command
Develop the situation through action
Combined arms
Adherence to law of war
Establish and maintain security
Create multiple dilemmas for the enemy

**Unified Logic Chart**

Introductory figure. ADRP 3-0 unified logic chart
Certain terms for which ADRP 3-0 is the proponent have been added, rescinded, or modified. The glossary contains acronyms and defined terms. (See introductory table 1 for new, modified, and rescinded Army terms.)

**Introductory table 1. New, modified, and rescinded Army terms**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Term</th>
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<tr>
<td>close combat</td>
<td>Modifies the definition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>consolidation area</td>
<td>New term.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>neutral</td>
<td>Army definition no longer used. Adopts common English usage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>position of relative advantage</td>
<td>Modifies the definition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unified land operations</td>
<td>Modifies the definition.</td>
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Chapter 1

Military Operations

This chapter discusses military operations, their interactions with operational environments and the threats that exist within them. The chapter then discusses unified action and joint operations. Lastly, this chapter discusses land operations and readiness for land operations through training.

AN OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

1-1. An operational environment is a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander (JP 3-0). Commanders at all levels have their own operational environments for their particular operations. An operational environment for any specific operation comprises more than the interacting variables that exist within a specific physical area. It also involves interconnected influences from the global or regional perspective (for example, politics and economics) that impact on conditions and operations there. Thus, each commander’s operational environment is part of a higher commander’s operational environment.

1-2. Operational environments include considerations at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of warfare. At the strategic level, leaders develop an idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic) in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve national objectives. The operational level links the tactical employment of forces to national and military strategic objectives, with the focus being on the design, planning, and execution of operations using operational art (see chapter 2 for a discussion of operational art). The tactical level of warfare involves the employment and ordered arrangement of forces in relation to each other. The levels of warfare help commanders visualize a logical arrangement of forces, allocate resources, and assign tasks based on a strategic purpose, informed by the conditions within their operational environments.

1-3. Broad trends such as globalization, urbanization, technological advances, and failing states affect land operations. These trends can create instability and contribute to an environment of persistent conflict. Persistent conflict is the protracted confrontation among state, nonstate, and individual actors willing to use violence to achieve political and ideological ends. In such an operational environment, commanders must seek and exploit opportunities for success. To exploit opportunities, commanders must thoroughly understand the dynamic nature of every operational environment. Previous experience within a similar operational environment is not enough to guarantee future mission success in the current one.

1-4. Threats seek to mass effects from multiple domains quickly enough to impede friendly operations. Their activities in the information environment, space, and cyberspace attempt to influence U.S. decision makers and disrupt friendly deployment of forces. Land-based threats will attempt to impede joint force freedom of action across the air, land, maritime, space, and cyberspace domains. They will disrupt the electromagnetic spectrum, sow confusion in the information environment, and challenge the legitimacy of U.S. actions. Understanding how threats can present multiple dilemmas to Army forces from the other domains helps Army commanders identify (or create), seize, and exploit their own opportunities during operations.

1-5. Modern information technology makes the information environment, which includes cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum, indispensable to military operations. The information environment is the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information (JP 3-13). It is a key part of any operational environment, and will be simultaneously congested and contested during operations. All actors in the information environment—enemy, friendly, or neutral—remain
Chapter 1

vulnerable to attack by physical, psychological, cyber, or electronic means. (See JP 3-12 (R) for more information on cyberspace operations and the electromagnetic spectrum.)

1-6. No two operational environments are the same. An operational environment consists of many relationships and interactions among interrelated variables. How entities and conditions interact within an operational environment is often difficult to understand and requires continuous analysis. (See the discussion beginning with paragraph 1-9 for operational and mission variables.)

1-7. An operational environment continually evolves as a result of the complexity of human interaction and how people learn and adapt. People’s actions change that environment. Some changes are anticipated, while others are not. Some changes are immediate and apparent, while other changes evolve over time or are extremely difficult to detect.

1-8. The complex and dynamic nature of an operational environment make determining the relationship between cause and effect difficult and contributes to the friction and uncertainty inherent in military operations. Commanders must continually assess their operational environments and re-assess their assumptions. Commanders and staffs use the Army design methodology, operational variables, and mission variables to analyze an operational environment in support of the operations process. (See chapter 4 for a discussion of the Army design methodology.)

OPERATIONAL AND MISSION VARIABLES

1-9. The operational environment evolves as each operation progresses. Army leaders use operational variables to analyze and understand a specific operational environment and use mission variables to focus on specific elements during mission analysis. (See annex A to FM 6-0 for a detailed discussion of operational and mission variables.)

Operational Variables

1-10. Army planners describe conditions of an operational environment in terms of operational variables. Operational variables are those aspects of an operational environment, both military and nonmilitary, that may differ from one operational area to another and affect operations. Operational variables describe not only the military aspects of an operational environment, but also the population’s influence on it. Using Army design methodology, planners analyze an operational environment in terms of eight interrelated operational variables: political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time (known as PMESII-PT). As soon as a commander and staff have an indication of where their unit will conduct operations, they begin analyzing the operational variables associated with that location. They continue to refine and update that analysis throughout the course of operations.

Mission Variables

1-11. Upon receipt of an order, Army leaders filter information from operational variables into mission variables during mission analysis. They use the mission variables to refine their understanding of the situation. The mission variables consist of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC). Incorporating the analysis of the operational variables with METT-TC ensures that Army leaders consider the best available information about the mission.

THREATS AND HAZARDS

1-12. For every operation, threats are a fundamental part of the operational environment. A threat is any combination of actors, entities, or forces that have the capability and intent to harm United States forces, United States national interests, or the homeland. Threats may include individuals, groups of individuals (organized or not organized), paramilitary or military forces, nation-states, or national alliances. Commanders and staffs must understand how current and potential threats organize, equip, train, employ, and control their forces. They must continually identify, monitor, and assess threats as they adapt and change over time.
1-13. In general, the various actors in any operational area can qualify as an enemy, an adversary, a neutral, or a friend. An enemy is a party identified as hostile against which the use of force is authorized. An enemy is also called a combatant and is treated as such under the law of war. Enemies will apply advanced technologies (such as cyber and space attack) as well as simple and dual-use technologies (such as improvised explosive devices). Enemies avoid U.S. strengths (such as long-range surveillance and precision strike missiles) through traditional countermeasures (such as dispersion, concealment, and intermingling with civilian populations).

1-14. An adversary is a party acknowledged as potentially hostile to a friendly party and against which the use of force may be envisaged (JP 3-0). In combat and combat support operations, a neutral is an identity applied to a track whose characteristics, behavior, origin, or nationality indicate that it is neither supporting nor opposing friendly forces. Finally, a friendly is a contact positively identified as a friend to support U.S. efforts. Land operations often prove complex because an enemy, an adversary, a neutral, or a friendly intermix, often with no easy means to distinguish one from another.

1-15. The term hybrid threat captures the complexity of operational environments, the multiplicity of actors involved, and the blurring between traditional elements of conflict. A hybrid threat is the diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, terrorist forces, or criminal elements unified to achieve mutually benefitting threat effects. Hybrid threats combine traditional forces governed by law, military tradition, and custom with unregulated forces that act without constraints on the use of violence. These may involve nation-states using proxy forces or nonstate actors such as criminal and terrorist organizations that employ sophisticated capabilities traditionally associated with states. Hybrid threats are most effective when they exploit friendly constraints, capability gaps, and lack of situational awareness.

1-16. A hazard is a condition with the potential to cause injury, illness, or death of personnel; damage to or loss of equipment or property; or mission degradation (JP 3-33). Hazards include disease, extreme weather phenomena, solar flares, and areas contaminated by toxic materials. Hazards can damage or destroy life, vital resources, and institutions, or prevent mission accomplishment. Understanding hazards and their effects on operations allows the commander to understand better the terrain, weather, and various other factors that best support the mission. Understanding hazards also helps the commander visualize potential impacts on operations. Successful interpretation of the environment aids in correctly opposing threat courses of action within a given geographical region.

1-17. A peer threat is an adversary or enemy with capabilities and capacity to oppose U.S. forces across multiple domains world-wide or in a specific region where they enjoy a position of relative advantage. Peer threats possess roughly equal combat power in geographical proximity to a conflict area with U.S. forces. A peer threat may also have a cultural affinity to specific regions providing them relative advantages in terms of time, space, and sanctuary. Peers threats generate tactical, operational, and strategic challenges in order of magnitude more challenging militarily than those the U.S. Army has faced since the Cold War.

1-18. Peer threats can employ resources across multiple domains to create lethal and nonlethal effects with operational significance throughout an operational environment. Peer threats seek to delay deployment of U.S. forces and inflict significant damage across multiple domains in a short period to achieve their goals before culminating. A peer threat uses various methods to employ their instruments of power to render U.S. military power irrelevant. Five broad methods, used in combination, include—

- Information warfare.
- Preclusion.
- Isolation.
- Sanctuary.
- Systems warfare.

1-19. Enemies and adversaries pursue antiaccess and area-denial capabilities, putting U.S. power projection at risk and enabling an extension of their coercive power well beyond their borders. As a result, the U.S. may be unable to employ forces the way it has in the past. The ability of U.S. forces to deliberately build up combat power, perform detailed rehearsals and integration activities, and then conduct operations on their own initiative will be significantly challenged. Threats might use cyberspace attack capabilities (such as disruptive and destructive malware), electronic warfare, and space capabilities (such as anti-satellite weapons) to disrupt U.S. communications; positioning, navigation, and timing; synchronization; and freedom.
of maneuver. Finally, enemies may attempt to strike installations outside the continental United States to disrupt or delay deployment of forces. These types of threats are not specific to any single theater of operations since they have few geographical constraints.

1-20. Violent extremist organizations work to undermine regional security in areas such as the Middle East and North Africa. Such groups radicalize populations, incite violence, and employ terror to impose their visions on fragile societies. They are strongest where governments are weakest, exploiting people trapped in fragile or failed states. Violent extremist organizations often coexist with criminal organizations, where both profit from illicit trade and the spread of corruption, further undermining security and stability.

WAR AS A HUMAN ENDEAVOR

1-21. War is chaotic, lethal, and a fundamentally human endeavor. It is a clash of wills often fought among and between people. All war is inherently about changing human behavior, with each side trying to alter the behavior of the other by force of arms. Success requires the ability to outthink an opponent and ruthlessly exploit the opportunities that come from positions of relative advantage. The side that best understands an operational environment learns and adapts more rapidly and decides to act more quickly in conditions of uncertainty is most likely to win.

1-22. Because war is a fundamentally human endeavor, it is inextricably tied to the populations inhabiting the land domain. All military capabilities are ultimately linked to land and, in most cases, the ability to prevail in ground combat becomes a decisive factor in breaking an enemy’s will. Understanding the human context that enables the enemy’s will, which includes culture, economics, and history, is as important as understanding the enemy’s military capabilities. Commanders cannot presume that superior military capability alone generates the desired effects on the enemy. Commanders must continually assess whether their operations are influencing enemies and populations, eroding the enemy’s will, and achieving the commanders’ intended purpose.

1-23. When unified land operations occur among populations, they influence and are influenced by those populations. The results of these interactions are often unpredictable—and potentially uncontrollable. Commanders should seek to do less harm than good to gain the support of populations and, when possible, to influence their behaviors. Gaining support requires a combination of both coercion and incentives, the exact mix of which is unique to each case. During operations to shape operational environments and prevent conflicts, the scale is weighted heavily towards incentivizing desired behavior. However, in large-scale combat operations, coercion may play a larger role. Consolidating gains requires a more balanced approach. Regardless of the context, U.S. forces always operate consistently with international law and their rules of engagement.

1-24. U.S. military forces operate to achieve the goals and objectives assigned to them by the President and Secretary of Defense. Normally, these goals and objectives involve establishing security conditions favorable to U.S. interests. Army forces do this as a function of unified action.

UNIFIED ACTION

1-25. Unified action is the synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort (JP 1). Unity of effort is coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization, which is the product of successful unified action (JP 1). Unified action partners are those military forces, governmental and nongovernmental organizations, and elements of the private sector with whom Army forces plan, coordinate, synchronize, and integrate during the conduct of operations. Military forces play a key role in unified action before, during, and after operations. The Army’s contribution to unified action is unified land operations. (See chapter 3.)

1-26. The Army is the dominant U.S. fighting force in the land domain. Army forces both depend upon and enable the joint forces across multiple domains (air, land, maritime, space, and cyberspace). This mutual interdependence creates powerful synergies and reflects that all operations have multi-domain components. The Army depends on the other Services for strategic and operational mobility, joint fires, and other key enabling capabilities. The Army supports other Services, combatant commands, and unified action partners
with ground-based indirect fires and ballistic missile defense, defensive cyberspace operations, electronic protection, communications, intelligence, rotary-wing aircraft, logistics, and engineering.

1-27. The Army’s ability to set and sustain the theater of operations is essential to allowing the joint force freedom of action. The Army establishes, maintains, and defends vital infrastructure. It also provides the joint force commander (JFC) with unique capabilities, such as port and airfield opening; logistics; chemical defense; and reception, staging, and onward movement, and integration of forces.

1-28. Interagency coordination is a key part of unified action. Interagency coordination is within the context of Department of Defense involvement, the coordination that occurs between elements of Department of Defense, and participating United States Government departments and agencies for the purpose of achieving an objective (JP 3-0). Army forces conduct and participate in interagency coordination using established liaison, personal engagement, and planning processes.

1-29. Unified action may require interorganizational cooperation to build the capacity of unified action partners. Interorganizational cooperation is interaction that occurs among elements of the Department of Defense; participating United States Government departments and agencies; state, territorial, local, and tribal agencies; foreign military forces and government agencies; international organizations; nongovernmental organizations; and the private sector (JP 3-08). Building partner capacity helps to secure populations, protects infrastructure, and strengthens institutions as a means of protecting common security interests. Building partner capacity results from comprehensive interorganizational activities, programs, and military-to-military engagements united by a common purpose. The Army integrates capabilities of operating forces and the institutional Army to support interorganizational capacity-building efforts, primarily through security cooperation interactions.

1-30. Security cooperation is all Department of Defense interactions with foreign security establishments to build security relationships that promote specific United States security interests, develop allied and partner nation military and security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide United States forces with peacetime and contingency access to allied and partner nations (JP 3-20). Security cooperation provides the means to build partner capacity and achieve strategic objectives. These objectives include—

- Building defensive and security relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests.
- Developing capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations.
- Providing U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nations to increase situational understanding of an operational environment.

1-31. Army forces support the objectives of the combatant commander’s campaign plan in accordance with appropriate policy, legal frameworks, and authorities. The plan supports those objectives through security cooperation, specifically those involving security force assistance and foreign internal defense. Security force assistance is the Department of Defense activities that support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions (JP 3-20). Foreign internal defense is participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security (JP 3-22).

1-32. Security force assistance and foreign internal defense professionalize and develop security partner capacity to enable synchronized sustaining operations. Army security cooperation interactions enable other interorganizational efforts to build partner capacity. Army forces—including special operations forces—advise, assist, train, and equip partner units to develop unit and individual proficiency in security operations. The institutional Army advises and trains partner Army activities to build institutional capacity for professional education, force generation, and force sustainment. (See FM 3-22 for more information on Army support to security cooperation.)
COOPERATION WITH CIVILIAN ORGANIZATIONS

1-33. When directed, Army forces provide sustainment and security for civilian organizations since many forces lack these capabilities. Within the context of interagency coordination, this refers to non-Department of Defense agencies of the U.S. Government. Other government agencies include, but are not limited to, Departments of State, Justice, Transportation, and Agriculture.

1-34. An intergovernmental organization is an organization created by a formal agreement between two or more governments on a global, regional, or functional basis to protect and promote national interests shared by member states. Intergovernmental organizations may be established on a global, regional, or functional basis for wide-ranging or narrowly defined purposes. Examples include the United Nations and the European Union.

1-35. A non-governmental organization is a private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society (JP 3-08). Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are independent, diverse, and flexible organizations focused on providing primary relief and development to supporting human rights, civil society, and conflict resolution organizations. Their mission is generally humanitarian and not one concerned with assisting the military in accomplishing its objectives. In some circumstances, NGOs may provide humanitarian aid simultaneously to elements of both sides in a conflict. Regardless, there are many situations where the interests of Army forces and NGOs overlap.

1-36. A contractor is a person or business operating under a legal agreement to provide products or services for pay. A contractor furnishes supplies and services or performs work at a certain price or rate based on contracted terms. Contracted support includes traditional goods and services support, but it may also include interpreter communications, infrastructure, and other related support. Contractor employees include contractors authorized to accompany the force as a formal part of the force and local national employees who normally have no special legal status. (See ATP 4-10 for more information on contractors.)

1-37. Most civilian organizations are not under military control, nor does the American ambassador or a United Nations commissioner control them. Civilian organizations have different organizational cultures and norms. Some may be willing to work with Army forces; others may not. Civilian organizations may arrive well after military operations have begun, making personal contact and team building essential. Command emphasis on immediate and continuous coordination encourages effective cooperation. Commanders should establish liaison with civilian organizations to integrate their efforts as much as possible with Army and joint operations. Civil affairs units typically establish this liaison. (See FM 3-57 for more information on civil affairs units.)

MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

1-38. Multinational operations is a collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance (JP 3-16). While each nation has its own interests and often participates within the limitations of national caveats, all nations bring value to an operation. Each nation’s force has unique capabilities, and each usually contributes to the operation’s legitimacy in terms of international or local acceptability. Army forces should anticipate that most operations will be multinational operations and plan accordingly. (See FM 3-16 for more information on multinational operations.)

1-39. An alliance is the relationship that results from a formal agreement between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives that further the common interests of the members (JP 3-0). Military alliances, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (commonly known as NATO), allow partners to establish formal, standard agreements.

1-40. A coalition is an arrangement between two or more nations for common action. Nations usually form coalitions for specific, limited purposes. A coalition action is an action outside the bounds of established alliances, usually in a narrow area of common interest. Army forces may participate in coalition actions under the authority of a United Nations’ resolution.
1-41. Multinational operations present challenges and demands. These include cultural and language issues, interoperability challenges, national caveats on the use of respective forces, the sharing of information and intelligence, and rules of engagement. Commanders analyze the particular requirements of a mission in the context of friendly force capabilities to exploit the multinational force’s advantages and compensate for its limitations. Establishing effective liaison with multinational partners is critical to situational awareness.

1-42. Multinational sustainment requires detailed planning and coordination. Normally each nation provides a national support element to sustain its deployed forces. However, integrated multinational sustainment may improve efficiency and effectiveness. When authorized and directed, an Army theater sustainment command can provide logistics and other support to multinational forces. Integrating support requirements of several nations’ forces—often spread over considerable distances and across international boundaries—is critical to the successful conduct of multinational operations and requires flexibility, patience, and persistence.

JOINT OPERATIONS

1-43. Single Services may accomplish tasks and missions in support of Department of Defense objectives. However, the Department of Defense primarily employs two or more Services (from two military departments) in a single operation across multiple domains, particularly in combat, through joint operations. Joint operations is a military actions conducted by joint forces and those Service forces employed in specified command relationships with each other, which of themselves, do not establish joint forces (JP 3-0). A joint force is a force composed of elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments operating under a single joint force commander (JP 3-0). Joint operations exploit the advantages of interdependent Service capabilities in multiple domains through unified action. Joint planning integrates military power with other instruments of national power (diplomatic, economic, and informational) to achieve a desired military end state. The end state is the set of required conditions that defines achievement of the commander’s objectives (JP 3-0). Joint planning connects the strategic end state to the JFC’s operational campaign design and ultimately to tactical missions. JFCs use campaigns and major operations to translate their operational-level actions into strategic results. A campaign is a series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space (JP 5-0). A major operation is a series of tactical actions (battles, engagements, strikes) conducted by combat forces, coordinated in time and place, to achieve strategic or operational objectives in an operational area (JP 3-0). Planning for a campaign is appropriate when the contemplated military operations exceed the scope of a single major operation. Campaigns are always joint operations. Army forces do not conduct campaigns unless they are designated as a joint task force. However, Army forces contribute to campaigns through the conduct of land operations. (See JP 5-0 for a discussion of campaigns.)

LAND OPERATIONS

1-44. An operation is a sequence of tactical actions with a common purpose or unifying theme (JP 1). The Army’s primary mission is to organize, train, and equip forces to conduct prompt and sustained land combat operations and perform such other duties, not otherwise assigned by law, as may be prescribed by the President or the Secretary of Defense (as described in Title 10, United States Code). The Army does this through its operational concept of unified land operations (see chapter 3.) Army doctrine aligns with joint doctrine and is informed by the nature of land operations. The command and control of operations on land fundamentally differs from other types of military operations.

1-45. Army forces, with unified action partners, conduct land operations to shape security environments, prevent conflict, prevail in ground combat, and consolidate gains. Army forces provide multiple options for responding to and resolving crises. Army forces defeat enemy forces, control terrain, secure populations, and preserve joint force freedom of action.

1-46. The dynamic interaction among friendly forces, enemy forces, adversaries, and the environment make land operations exceedingly complex. Understanding each of these elements separately is necessary, but not sufficient, to understand their relationships with each other. Understanding the context of dynamic interaction in each case helps commanders determine what constitutes positions of relative advantage. Exploiting positions of relative advantage allows Army forces to defeat adversaries and enemies at minimal cost.
Joint doctrine discusses traditional war as a confrontation between nation-states or coalitions of nations. This confrontation typically involves small-scale to large-scale, force-on-force military operations in which enemies use various conventional and unconventional military capabilities against each other. Landpower heavily influences the outcome of wars even when it is not the definitive instrument. **Landpower is the ability—by threat, force, or occupation—to gain, sustain, and exploit control over land, resources, and people.** Landpower is the basis of unified land operations. Landpower includes the ability to—

- Protect and defend U.S. national assets and interests.
- Impose the Nation’s will on an enemy, by force if necessary.
- Sustain high tempo operations.
- Engage to influence, shape, prevent, and deter in an operational environment.
- Defeat enemy organizations and control terrain.
- Secure populations and consolidate gains.
- Establish and maintain a stable environment that sets the conditions for political and economic development.
- Address the consequences of catastrophic events—both natural and manmade—to restore infrastructure and reestablish basic civil services.

**Characteristics**

1-48. Land operations, particularly large-scale ground combat, focus on destroying or dislocating enemy forces or securing key land objectives that reduce the enemy’s ability to conduct operations. Five characteristics distinguish land operations: scope, duration, terrain, permanence, and civilian presence. The characteristics of land operations contribute to the complexity and uncertainty of the environment in which Army forces conduct operations.

**Scope**

1-49. Land operations occur across the entire expanse of the land domain and across the range of military operations. Land combat can occur between forces comprising hundreds of thousands of combatants representing multiple nations or small units in a single neighborhood. Large-scale ground combat is the most demanding and lethal end of the conflict continuum and the benchmark against which the Army is equipped and trained. However, the Army is routinely employed all over the world for operations more limited scope and lethality.

**Duration**

1-50. Land operations are repetitive and continuous. Army forces remain in contact with enemy forces almost continuously until they resolve the conflict. The effort required to commit Army forces implies the willingness to persevere as long as necessary to achieve the operational goal. To achieve the goal requires units with endurance and the capabilities to sustain them.

**Terrain**

1-51. The complex variety of natural and manmade features of the land environment contrasts significantly with the relative uniformity of the air, sea, space, and cyberspace environments. Weather and climate variations contribute significantly to the considerations of ground combat.

**Permanence**

1-52. Land operations generally involve seizing or securing terrain. With control of terrain comes control of populations and their associated activities. Those whose behavior U.S. forces wish to change are resident on land and must ultimately be controlled there. Controlling inhabitants requires Army forces to conduct operations that make enduring the often temporary effects of other kinds of operations.
Civilian Presence

1-53. Land operations affect civilians by disrupting routine life patterns and potentially placing civilians in harm’s way. Additionally, land combat often impacts civilian access to necessary items such as food, water, and medical supplies. There are few uninhabited places in which the Army is likely to fight, so Army forces must plan to conduct minimum-essential stability tasks (providing security, food, water, shelter, and medical treatment) as an integral part of land combat.

ARMY FORCES—EXPEDITIONARY CAPABILITY AND CAMPAIGN QUALITY

1-54. Swift campaigns, however desirable, are the historical exception. Whenever objectives involve controlling populations or dominating terrain, campaign success usually requires employing landpower for protracted periods. The Army’s combination of expeditionary capability and campaign quality contributes sustained landpower in support of unified action.

1-55. Expeditionary capability describes the ability to promptly deploy combined arms forces on short notice to any location in the world, capable of conducting operations immediately upon arrival. Expeditionary operations are dependent upon joint air and maritime support. Operational reach is the distance and duration across which a force can successfully employ military capabilities (JP 3-0). Adequate operational reach is a necessity for forces to conduct decisive action (see chapter 3 for a detailed discussion of decisive action). Extending operational reach is a significant concern for commanders. To achieve a desired end state, forces must possess the necessary operational reach to establish and maintain conditions that define success. Commanders and staffs increase operational reach through deliberate, focused planning—well in advance of operations when possible—and the appropriate sustainment to facilitate endurance.

1-56. Expeditionary capabilities are more than physical attributes; they begin with a mindset that permeates the force. The ability to deploy the right combination of Army forces to the right place at the right time requires unit leadership focused on the training and readiness essential to deploying. Forward deployed units, forward positioned capabilities, and force projection—from anywhere in the world—all contribute to the Army’s expeditionary capabilities. Providing JFCs with expeditionary capabilities requires forces organized and equipped to be modular, versatile, and rapidly deployable, as well as able to sustain operations over time.

1-57. Campaign quality describes the Army’s ability to sustain operations as long as necessary to achieve success. Campaign quality is an ability to conduct sustaining operations for as long as necessary, adapting to unpredictable and often profound changes in an operational environment as the campaign unfolds. Army forces are organized, trained, and equipped for endurance. They are essential to the JFC for the conduct of campaigns. The Army’s Sustainable Readiness Model (formerly the Army Force Generation Model) provides force generation policies and processes that extend expeditionary capabilities and campaign quality to pre- and post-combat campaign periods. Campaigning requires a mindset and vision that complements expeditionary requirements. Soldiers understand that for the length of their deployment, the Army will take care of them and their families. Army leaders understand the effects of protracted land operations on units and adjust the tempo of operations whenever circumstances allow prolonging their effectiveness.

CLOSE COMBAT

1-58. The nature of close combat in land operations is unique. Combatants routinely come face-to-face with one another in large numbers in a wide variety of operational environments comprising all types of terrain. When other means fail to drive enemy forces from their positions, Army forces close with and destroy or capture them. The outcome of battles and engagements depends on the ability of Army forces to prevail in close combat. Close combat is that part of warfare carried out on land in a direct-fire fight, supported by direct and indirect fires and other assets. Units involved in close combat employ direct fire weapons supported by indirect fire, air-delivered fires, and nonlethal engagement means. Units in close combat defeat or destroy enemy forces as well as seize and retain ground. Close combat at lower echelons contains many more interactions between friendly and enemy forces than any other form of combat.

1-59. Close combat is most often linked to difficult terrain where enemies seek to negate friendly advantages in technology and weapon capabilities. Urban terrain represents one of the most likely close combat challenges. The complexity of urban terrain and the density of noncombatants reduce the effectiveness of advanced sensors and long-range weapons. Operations in large, densely populated areas require special
considerations. From a planning perspective, commanders view cities as both topographic features and a dynamic system of varying operational entities containing hostile forces, local populations, and infrastructure.

1-60. Effective close combat relies on lethality informed by a high degree of situational understanding across multiple domains. The capacity for physical destruction is the foundation of all other military capabilities and the basic building block of military operations. Army formations are organized, equipped, and trained to employ lethal capabilities in a wide range of conditions. The demonstrated lethality of Army forces provides the credibility essential to deterring adversaries and assuring allies and partners.

1-61. An inherent, complementary relationship exists between using lethal force and applying military capabilities for nonlethal purposes. In wartime, each situation requires a different mix of violence and constraint, lethal and nonlethal actions used together complement each other and create multiple dilemmas for opponents. During operations short of armed conflict, the lethality implicit in Army forces enables their conduct of other tasks effectively with minimal adversary interference.

READINESS THROUGH TRAINING

1-62. Training is the most important thing the Army does to prepare for operations, and it is the cornerstone of combat readiness. Training is the foundation for successful operations. Effective training must be commander driven, rigorous, realistic, and to the standard and under the conditions that units are expected to fight. Realistic training with limited time and resources demands that commanders focus their unit training efforts to maximize repetitions under varying conditions to build proficiency. Units execute effective individual and collective training based on the Army’s principles of training as described in ADRP 7-0. Through training and leader development, units achieve the tactical and technical competence that builds confidence and allows them to conduct successful operations across the conflict continuum. Achieving this competence requires specific, dedicated training on offensive, defensive, and stability or defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) tasks. Training continues in deployed units to sustain skills and to adapt to changes in an operational environment. (See ADRP 7-0 for training doctrine.)

1-63. Army training includes a system of techniques and standards that allows Soldiers and units to determine, acquire, and practice necessary skills. The Army’s training system emphasizes experiential practice and learning to build teamwork and cohesion within units. It recognizes that Soldiers ultimately fight for one another and their units. Training instills discipline. It conditions Soldiers to operate within the law of war and rules of engagement. Training prepares unit leaders for the harsh reality of land combat by emphasizing the fluid and disorderly conditions inherent in land operations. Commanders emphasize the principles of mission command during training. Effective training accounts for cyberspace, space, and information-related capabilities that influence the warfighting functions. Well-rounded training combined with candid assessments, after action reviews, and applied lessons learned produce quality leaders and versatile units.

1-64. Regardless of the importance of technological capabilities, success in operations requires Soldiers to accomplish the mission. Today’s operational environments require professional Soldiers and leaders whose character, commitment, and competence represent the foundation of a values-based, trained, and ready Army. Today’s Soldiers and leaders adapt and learn while training to perform tasks both individually and collectively. Soldiers and leaders develop the ability to exercise judgment and disciplined initiative under stress. Army leaders and their subordinates must remain—

- Honorable servants of the Nation.
- Competent and committed professionals.
- Dedicated to living by and upholding the Army Ethic.
- Able to articulate mission orders to operate within their commander’s intent.
- Committed to developing their subordinates and creating shared understanding while building mutual trust and cohesion.
- Courageous enough to accept prudent risk and exercise disciplined initiative while seeking to exploit opportunities in a dynamic and complex operational environment.
- Trained to operate across the range of military operations.
Able to operate in combined arms teams within unified action and leverage other capabilities in achieving their objectives.

Able to apply cultural understanding to make the right decisions and take the right actions.

Opportunistic and offensively minded.

1-65. The complexity of integrating all unified action partners into operations demands that Army forces maintain a high degree of proficiency that is difficult to achieve quickly. Leaders at all echelons seek training opportunities involving the Regular Army and Reserve Components, and with unified action partners at home station, at combat training centers, and when deployed. Formations also train in contested conditions that emphasize degraded friendly capabilities, reduced time for preparation, and austere expeditionary conditions.

1-66. U.S. responsibilities are global and Army forces prepare to operate in any environment. Because Army forces face diverse threats and mission requirements, commanders adjust their training priorities based on a likely operational environment. As units prepare for deployment, commanders adapt training priorities and conditions to best address tasks required by actual or anticipated operations. The Army as a whole trains to be flexible enough to operate successfully across the range of military operations. Units train to be agile enough to adapt quickly and shift with little effort from a focus on one portion of the conflict continuum to a focus on another portion.
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This chapter discusses the application and elements of operational art. It also discusses defeat and stability mechanisms.

THE APPLICATION OF OPERATIONAL ART

2-1. Army commanders use operational art and the principles of joint operations to envision how to establish conditions that accomplish their missions and achieve assigned objectives. Operational art is the cognitive approach by commanders and staffs—supported by their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment—to develop strategies, campaigns, and operations to organize and employ military forces by integrating ends, ways, and means (JP 3-0). For Army forces, operational art is the pursuit of strategic objectives, in whole or in part, through the arrangement of tactical actions in time, space, and purpose. Operational art applies to all types and aspects of operations. It integrates ends, ways, and means while accounting for risk.

2-2. The twelve principles of joint operations represent important factors that affect the conduct of operations across the levels of warfare. (See table 2-1 on page 2-2.) The principles are broadly applicable considerations whose relevance varies in each case; they are not a checklist. Commanders generally consider all twelve principles but may not apply them in the same way in every operation. The principles summarize the characteristics of successful operations throughout history. Their greatest value lies in educating military professionals. While considering the principles of joint operations, commanders determine if or when to deviate from the principles based on the current situation. (See JP 3-0 for a detailed discussion on the principles of joint operations.)

2-3. When applying operational art, commanders and staff ensure a shared understanding of purpose. This requires open, continuous collaboration between commanders at various echelons of command to define accurately the problems and conditions of an operational environment. Effective collaboration facilitates assessment, fosters critical analysis, and anticipates opportunities and risk.

2-4. Operational art encompasses all levels, from strategic direction to tactical actions. It requires creative vision, broad experience, and a knowledge of capabilities, tactics, and techniques across multiple domains. It is through operational art that commanders translate their operational approach into a concept of operations. A concept of operations is a verbal or graphic statement that clearly and concisely expresses what the joint force commander intends to accomplish and how it will be done using available resources (JP 5-0). Commanders then position and maneuver forces to conduct tasks that best achieve a desired end state.
Table 2-1. Principles of joint operations

- **Objective**: Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and achievable goal.
- **Offensive**: Seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.
- **Mass**: Concentrate the effects of combat power at the most advantageous place and time to produce decisive results.
- **Maneuver**: Place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible application of combat power.
- **Economy of force**: Expend minimum-essential combat power on secondary efforts to allocate the maximum possible combat power on primary efforts.
- **Unity of command**: Ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander for every objective.
- **Security**: Prevent the enemy from acquiring an unexpected advantage.
- **Surprise**: Strike at a time or place or in a manner for which the enemy is unprepared.
- **Simplicity**: Increase the probability that plans and operations will be executed as intended by preparing clear, uncomplicated plans and concise orders.
- **Restraint**: Limit collateral damage and prevent the unnecessary use of force.
- **Perseverance**: Ensure the commitment necessary to attain the national strategic end state.
- **Legitimacy**: Maintain legal and moral authority in the conduct of operations.

2-5. Army design methodology assists the commander and the staff in developing an operational approach. (See ATP 5-0.1 for more information on Army design methodology.) By applying the Army design methodology, the commander and the staff gain a shared understanding of the environment and can define the problems preventing the desired end state. This differs from mission analysis since it is not mission specific. (See figure 2-1.)

![Figure 2-1. Army design methodology](image)

2-6. The understanding generated with the Army design methodology enables the commander to develop an operational approach that establishes conditions to accomplish the mission. (See figure 2-2.) The **operational approach** is a broad description of the mission, operational concepts, tasks, and actions required to accomplish the mission (JP 5-0). The operational approach provides a framework that relates tactical tasks to the desired end state. It provides a unifying purpose and focus to all operations.
DEFEAT AND STABILITY MECHANISMS

2-7. When developing an operational approach, commanders consider methods to employ a combination of defeat mechanisms and stability mechanisms. Defeat mechanisms relate to offensive and defensive tasks; stability mechanisms relate to stability tasks, security, and consolidating gains in an area of operations.

2-8. A defeat mechanism is a method through which friendly forces accomplish their mission against enemy opposition. Army forces at all echelons use combinations of four defeat mechanisms: destroy, dislocate, disintegrate, and isolate. Applying more than one defeat mechanism simultaneously produces complementary and reinforcing effects not attainable with a single mechanism. Used individually, a defeat mechanism achieves results relative to the amount of effort expended. Using defeat mechanisms in combination creates enemy dilemmas that magnify their effects significantly.

2-9. When commanders destroy, they apply lethal combat power on an enemy capability so that it can no longer perform any function. Destroy is a tactical mission task that physically renders an enemy force combat-ineffective until it is reconstituted. Alternatively, to destroy a combat system is to damage it so badly that it cannot perform any function or be restored to a usable condition without being entirely rebuilt (FM 3-90-1). The enemy cannot restore a destroyed force to a usable condition without entirely rebuilding it.

2-10. Dislocate is to employ forces to obtain significant positional advantage, rendering the enemy’s dispositions less valuable, perhaps even irrelevant. Commanders often achieve dislocation by placing forces in locations where the enemy does not expect them.

2-11. Disintegrate means to disrupt the enemy’s command and control system, degrading its ability to conduct operations while leading to a rapid collapse of the enemy’s capabilities or will to fight. Commanders often achieve disintegration by specifically targeting the enemy’s command structure and communications systems.

2-12. Isolate is a tactical mission task that requires a unit to seal off—both physically and psychologically—an enemy from sources of support, deny the enemy freedom of movement, and prevent the isolated enemy force from having contact with other enemy forces (FM 3-90-1). When commanders isolate, they deny an enemy or adversary access to capabilities that enable an enemy unit to maneuver at will in time and space.

2-13. Commanders describe a defeat mechanism by the three types of effects they produce:

- Physical effects: Those things that are material.
- Temporal effects: Those that occur at a specific point in time.
- Cognitive effects: Those that pertain to or affect the mind.

Operational art formulates the most effective, efficient way to apply defeat mechanisms. Physically defeating the enemy deprives enemy forces of the ability to achieve those aims. Temporally defeating the enemy anticipates enemy reactions and counters them before they can become effective. Cognitively defeating the enemy disrupts decision making and deprives the enemy of the will to fight.
2-14. In addition to defeating an enemy, Army forces often seek to stabilize an area of operations by performing stability tasks. There are six primary stability tasks:
- Establish civil security.
- Establish civil control.
- Restore essential services.
- Support governance.
- Support economic and infrastructure development.
- Conduct security cooperation.

2-15. The combination of stability tasks conducted during operations depends on the situation. In some operations, the host nation can meet most or all of the population’s requirements. In those cases, Army forces work with and through host-nation authorities. Commanders use civil affairs operations to mitigate how the military presence affects the population and vice versa. Conversely, Army forces operating in a failed state may need to support the local population and work with civilian organizations to restore basic capabilities. Civil affairs operations are essential in establishing the trust between Army forces and civilian organizations required for effective working relationships.

2-16. A stability mechanism is the primary method through which friendly forces affect civilians in order to attain conditions that support establishing a lasting, stable peace. As with defeat mechanisms, combinations of stability mechanisms produce complementary and reinforcing effects that accomplish the mission more effectively and efficiently than single mechanisms do alone.

2-17. The four stability mechanisms are compel, control, influence, and support. Compel means to use, or threaten to use, lethal force to establish control and dominance, affect behavioral change, or enforce compliance with mandates, agreements, or civil authority. Control involves imposing civil order. Influence means to alter the opinions, attitudes, and ultimately the behavior of foreign friendly, neutral, adversary, and enemy audiences through messages, presence, and actions. Support establishes, reinforces, or sets the conditions necessary for the instruments of national power to function effectively.

THE ELEMENTS OF OPERATIONAL ART

2-18. In applying operational art, Army commanders and their staffs use intellectual tools to help understand an operational environment as well as visualize and describe their approach for conducting an operation. Collectively, these tools are the elements of operational art. They help commanders understand, visualize, and describe the integration and synchronization of the elements of combat power as well as their commander’s intent and guidance. Commanders selectively use these tools in any operation. Their broadest application applies to long-term operations.

2-19. Not all elements of operational art apply at all levels of warfare. A company commander concerned about the tempo of an upcoming operation is probably not concerned with an enemy’s center of gravity. A corps commander may consider all elements of operational art in developing a plan in support of the JFC. As such, the elements of operational art are flexible enough to apply when pertinent.

2-20. As some elements of operational design apply only to JFCs, the Army modifies the elements of operational design into elements of operational art by adding Army-specific elements. During the planning and execution of Army operations, commanders and staffs consider the elements of operational art as they assess the situation. They adjust current and future operations and plans as the operation unfolds, and they reframe as necessary. (See table 2-2.)

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<thead>
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*Common to elements of operational design
END STATE AND CONDITIONS

2-21. The end state is a set of desired future conditions the commander wants to exist when an operation ends. Commanders include the end state in their planning guidance. A clearly defined end state promotes unity of effort; facilitates integration, synchronization, and disciplined initiative; and helps mitigate risk.

2-22. Army operations typically focus on achieving the military end state that may include contributions to establishing nonmilitary conditions. Commanders explicitly describe the end state and its conditions for every operation. Otherwise, missions become vague, and operations lose focus. Successful commanders direct every operation toward a clearly defined, conclusive, and attainable end state (the objective).

2-23. The end state may evolve as an operation progresses. Commanders continuously monitor operations and evaluate their progress. They evaluate the validity of assumptions and running staff estimates. Commanders use formal and informal assessment methods to assess their progress in achieving the end state and determine if they need to refocus. The end state should anticipate future operations and set conditions for transitions.

CENTER OF GRAVITY

2-24. A center of gravity is the source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act (JP 5-0). The loss of a center of gravity can ultimately result in defeat. The center of gravity is a vital analytical tool for planning operations. It provides a focal point and identifies sources of strength and weakness. However, the concept of center of gravity is only meaningful when considered in relation to the objectives of the mission.

2-25. Centers of gravity are not limited to military forces and can be both physical and moral. They are part of a dynamic perspective of an operational environment and therefore may change as the environment changes. Physical centers of gravity, such as a capital city or military force, are tangible and typically easier to identify, assess, and account for than moral centers of gravity. Physical centers of gravity can often be influenced solely by military means. In contrast, moral centers of gravity are intangible and more difficult to influence. They can include a charismatic leader, powerful ruling elite, or united population. Military means alone usually prove ineffective when targeting moral centers of gravity. Affecting them requires collective, integrated efforts of all instruments of national power.

2-26. A center of gravity has subcomponents comprising a system, such as command and control or logistics, which can be targeted for information collection and attack. This targeting can identify critical vulnerabilities in the system, such as communications or enemy morale, against which commanders can apply friendly capabilities.

2-27. Commanders analyze a center of gravity thoroughly and in detail. Faulty conclusions drawn from hasty or abbreviated analyses can adversely affect operations, waste critical resources, and incur undue risk. Thoroughly understanding an operational environment helps commanders identify and target enemy centers of gravity. This understanding encompasses how enemies organize, fight, and make decisions. It includes their physical and moral strengths and weaknesses. This understanding helps planners identify centers of gravity, their associated decisive points, and the best approach for achieving the desired end state.

DECISIVE POINTS

2-28. A decisive point is a geographic place, specific key event, critical factor, or function that, when acted upon, allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an enemy or contribute materially to achieving success (JP 5-0). Decisive points help commanders select clear, conclusive, attainable objectives that directly contribute to achieving the end state. Geographic decisive points can include port facilities, distribution networks and nodes, and bases of operation. Specific events and elements of an enemy force may also be decisive points. Examples of such events include commitment of the enemy operational reserve and reopening a major oil refinery.

2-29. A common characteristic of decisive points is their importance to a center of gravity. Decisive points are not centers of gravity; they are key to attacking or protecting centers of gravity and comprise parts of its system. A decisive point’s importance requires the enemy to commit significant resources to defend it. The
loss of a decisive point weakens a center of gravity and may expose more decisive points. More decisive points can eventually lead to an attack on the center of gravity itself. Commanders identify the decisive points that offer the greatest physical, temporal, or psychological advantage against centers of gravity.

2-30. Decisive points apply to both the operational and tactical levels when shaping the concept of operations. Decisive points enable commanders to seize, retain, or exploit the initiative. Controlling them is essential to mission accomplishment. Enemy control of a decisive point may stall friendly momentum, force early culmination, or allow an enemy counterattack.

LINES OF OPERATIONS AND LINES OF EFFORT

2-31. Lines of operations and lines of effort link objectives to the end state physically and conceptually. Commanders may describe an operation along lines of operations, lines of effort, or a combination of both. The combination of them may change based on the conditions within an area of operations. Commanders synchronize and sequence actions, deliberately creating complementary and reinforcing effects. The lines then converge on the well-defined, commonly understood end state outlined in the commander’s intent.

2-32. Commanders at all levels may use lines of operations and lines of effort to develop tasks and allocate resources. Commanders may designate one line as the decisive operation and others as shaping operations. Commanders synchronize and sequence related actions along multiple lines. Seeing these relationships helps commanders assess progress toward achieving the end state as forces perform tasks and accomplish missions.

Lines of Operations

2-33. A line of operations is a line that defines the directional orientation of a force in time and space in relation to the enemy and links the force with its base of operations and objectives. Lines of operations connect a series of decisive points that lead to control of a geographic or force-oriented objective. Operations designed using lines of operations generally consist of a series of actions executed according to a well-defined sequence. A force operates on interior and exterior lines. Interior lines are lines on which a force operates when its operations converge on a central point. Interior lines allow commanders to move quickly against enemy forces along shorter lines of operation. Exterior lines are lines on which a force operates when its operations diverge from a central point. Exterior lines allow commanders to concentrate forces against multiple positions on the ground, thus presenting multiple dilemmas to the enemy. Lines of operations tie offensive and defensive tasks to the geographic and positional references in the area of operations.

Lines of Effort

2-34. A line of effort is a line that links multiple tasks using the logic of purpose rather than geographical reference to focus efforts toward establishing a desired end state. Lines of effort are essential to long-term planning when positional references to an enemy or adversary have little relevance. In operations involving many nonmilitary factors, lines of effort may be the only way to link tasks to the end state. Lines of effort are often essential to helping commanders visualize how military capabilities can support the other instruments of national power.

2-35. Commanders use lines of effort to describe their vision of operations achieving intangible end state conditions. These lines of effort show how individual actions relate to each other and to achieving the end state. Commanders often use stability and DSCA tasks along lines of effort. These tasks link military actions with the broader interagency or interorganizational effort across the levels of warfare. As operations progress, commanders may modify the lines of effort after assessing conditions. Commanders use measures of performance and measures of effectiveness to continually assess operations. A measure of performance is a criterion used to assess friendly actions that is tied to measuring task accomplishment. A measure of effectiveness is a criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect.

Combining Lines of Operations and Lines of Effort

2-36. Commanders use lines of operations and lines of effort to connect objectives to a central, unifying purpose. The difference between lines of operations and lines of effort is that lines of operations are oriented on physical linkages, while lines of effort are oriented on logical linkages. Combining lines of operations and
lines of effort allows a commander to include stability or DSCA tasks in the long-term plan. This combination
helps commanders begin consolidating gains and set the end state conditions for transitions in the operation.
(See chapter 3 for a discussion of consolidating gains.)

TEMPO

2-37. *Tempo* is the relative speed and rhythm of military operations over time with respect to the
enemy. It reflects the rate of military action. Controlling tempo helps commanders keep the initiative during
combat operations or rapidly establish a sense of normalcy during humanitarian crises. During combat
operations, commanders normally seek to maintain a higher tempo than the enemy. A rapid tempo can
overwhelm an enemy’s ability to counter friendly actions. During other operations, commanders act quickly
to control events and deny the enemy positions of advantage. By acting faster than the situation deteriorates,
commanders can change the dynamics of a crisis and restore favorable conditions.

2-38. Commanders control tempo throughout the conduct of operations. First, they formulate operations that
exploit the complementary and reinforcing effects of simultaneous and sequential operations. They
synchronize those operations in time and space to degrade enemy capabilities throughout the area of
operations. Second, commanders avoid unnecessary engagements. They do this by bypassing resistance and
avoiding places not considered decisive. Third, through mission command, commanders enable subordinates
to exercise initiative and act independently. Controlling tempo requires both audacity and patience. Audacity
initiates the actions needed to develop a situation; patience allows a situation to develop until the force can
strike at the most crucial time and place. Ultimately, the goal is maintaining a tempo appropriate to retaining
and exploiting the initiative and achieving the end state.

2-39. Army forces expend more energy and resources when operating at a high tempo. Commanders assess
their force’s capacity to operate at a higher tempo based on its performance and available resources. An
effective operational design varies tempo throughout an operation to increase endurance while maintaining
appropriate speed and momentum. There is more to tempo than speed. While speed can be important,
commanders vary speed to achieve endurance and optimize operational reach.

PHASING AND TRANSITIONS

2-40. A *phase* is a planning and execution tool used to divide an operation in duration or activity. A
change in phase usually involves a change of mission, task organization, or rules of engagement. Phasing
helps in planning and controlling, and it may be indicated by time, distance, terrain, or an event. The ability
of Army forces to extend operations in time and space, coupled with a desire to dictate tempo, often presents
commanders with more objectives and decisive points than the force can engage simultaneously. This may
require commanders and staffs to consider sequencing operations.

2-41. Phasing is critical to arranging all tasks of an operation that cannot be conducted simultaneously. It
describes how the commander envisions the overall operation unfolding. It is the logical expression of the
commander’s visualization in time. Within a phase, a large portion of the force executes similar or mutually
supporting activities. Achieving a specified condition or set of conditions typically marks the end of a phase.

2-42. Simultaneity, depth, and tempo are vital to all operations. However, forces cannot always attain them
to the degree desired. In such cases, commanders limit the number of objectives and decisive points engaged
simultaneously. They deliberately sequence certain actions to maintain tempo while focusing combat power
at a decisive point in time and space. Commanders employ a combination of simultaneous and sequential
tasks during an operation to establish end state conditions.

2-43. Phasing can extend operational reach. When the force lacks the capability to accomplish the mission
in a single action commanders phase the operation. Each phase should strive to—

- Focus effort.
- Concentrate combat power in time and space at a decisive point.
- Achieve its objectives deliberately and logically.

2-44. Transitions mark a change of focus between phases or between the ongoing operation and execution
of a branch or sequel. Shifting priorities among offensive, defensive, stability, and DSCA tasks also involve
a transition. Transitions require planning and preparation well before their execution, so the force can
maintain the momentum and tempo of operations. The force is vulnerable during transitions, and commanders establish clear conditions for their execution.

2-45. A transition occurs for several reasons. Transitions occur when delivering essential services, retaining infrastructure needed for reconstruction, or when consolidating gains. (See paragraphs 3-28 through 3-38 for a discussion of consolidating gains.) An unexpected change in conditions may require commanders to direct an abrupt transition between phases. In such cases, the overall composition of the force remains unchanged despite sudden changes in mission, task organization, and rules of engagement. Typically, task organization evolves to meet changing conditions; however, transition planning must also account for changes in mission. Commanders continuously assess the situation, and they task-organize and cycle their forces to retain the initiative. Commanders strive to achieve changes in emphasis without incurring an operational pause.

2-46. Commanders identify potential transitions during planning and account for them throughout execution. Considerations for identifying potential transitions should include—

- Forecasting in advance when and how to transition.
- Arranging tasks to facilitate transitions.
- Creating a task organization that anticipates transitions.
- Rehearsing certain transitions such as from defense to counterattack or from offense to consolidating gains.
- Ensuring the force understands different rules of engagement during transitions.

2-47. Commanders should appreciate the time required to both plan for and execute transitions. Assessment ensures that commanders measure progress toward such transitions and take appropriate actions to prepare for and execute them.

**Culmination**

2-48. The **culminating point** is a point at which a force no longer has the capability to continue its form of operations, offense or defense (JP 5-0). Culmination represents a crucial shift in relative combat power. It is relevant to both attackers and defenders at each level of warfare. While conducting offensive tasks, the culminating point occurs when the force cannot continue the attack and must assume a defensive posture or execute an operational pause. While conducting defensive tasks, it occurs when the force can no longer defend itself and must withdraw or risk destruction. The culminating point is more difficult to identify when Army forces conduct stability tasks. Two conditions can result in culmination while performing stability tasks: units being too dispersed to achieve security and units lacking required resources to achieve the end state. While conducting DSCA tasks, culmination may occur if forces must respond to more catastrophic events than they can manage simultaneously. Such a situation results in culmination due to exhaustion.

2-49. A culmination may be a planned event. In such cases, the concept of operations predicts which part of the force will culminate, and the task organization includes additional forces to assume the mission after culmination. Typically, culmination is caused by direct combat actions or higher echelon resourcing decisions. Culmination relates to the force’s ability to generate and apply combat power, and it is not a lasting condition. To continue operations after culminating, commanders may reinforce or reconstitute tactical units.

**Operational Reach**

2-50. Operational reach reflects the ability to achieve success through a well-conceived operational approach and is applicable to Army forces operating as part of the joint force. Operational reach is a tether; it is a function of intelligence, protection, sustainment, endurance, and relative combat power. The limit of a unit’s operational reach is its culminating point. Operational reach balances the natural tension among endurance, momentum, and protection. Commanders seek to extend the operational reach far enough to achieve their objectives prior to culmination.

2-51. Endurance refers to the ability to employ combat power anywhere for protracted periods. It stems from the ability to organize, protect, and sustain a force, regardless of the distance from its base and the austerity of the environment. Endurance involves anticipating requirements and making the most effective, efficient use of available resources. Endurance contributes to Army forces’ ability to make enduring the transitory effects of other capabilities.
2-52. Momentum comes from retaining the initiative and executing high-tempo operations that overwhelm enemy resistance. Commanders control momentum by maintaining focus and pressure. They set a tempo that prevents exhaustion and maintains adequate sustainment. A sustainable tempo extends operational reach. Commanders maintain momentum by anticipating and transitioning rapidly between any combination of offensive, defensive, stability, or DSCA tasks. Momentum prevents the enemy from recovering the initiative. Sometimes commanders push the force to its culminating point to take maximum advantage of an opportunity. Exploitations and pursuits often involve pushing all available forces to the limit of their endurance to capitalize on momentum and retain the initiative.

2-53. Protection is an important contributor to operational reach. Commanders anticipate how enemy actions and environmental factors might disrupt operations and then determine the protection capabilities required to maintain sufficient reach. Protection closely relates to endurance and momentum. It also contributes to the commander’s ability to extend operations in time and space. The protection warfighting function helps commanders maintain the force’s integrity and combat power.

2-54. Commanders and staffs consider operational reach to ensure Army forces accomplish their missions before culminating. Commanders continually strive to extend operational reach. They assess friendly and enemy force status and civil considerations, anticipate culmination, consolidate gains, and plan operational pauses if necessary. The use of basing can sustain operational reach in time and space.

**Basing**

2-55. Army basing overseas typically falls into two general categories: permanent (bases or installations) and nonpermanent (base camps). A base is a locality from which operations are projected or supported (JP 4-0). Generally, bases are in host nations in which the United States has a long-term lease and a status-of-forces agreement. A base camp is an evolving military facility that supports the military operations of a deployed unit and provides the necessary support and services for sustained operations. Base camps are nonpermanent by design and designated as a base when the intention is to make them permanent. Bases or base camps may have a specific purpose (such as serving as an intermediate staging base, a logistics base, or a base camp) or they may be multifunctional. The longer base camps exist, the more they exhibit many of the same characteristics as bases in terms of the support and services provided and types of facilities developed. A base or base camp has a defined perimeter, has established access controls, and takes advantage of natural and manmade features.

2-56. Basing may be joint or single Service and will routinely support both U.S. and multinational forces, as well as interagency partners, operating anywhere along the range of military operations. Commanders often designate a specific area as a base or base camp and assign responsibility to a single commander for protection and terrain management within the base. Units located within the base or base camp are under the tactical control of the base or base camp commander for base security and defense. Within large echelon support areas or joint security areas, controlling commanders may designate base clusters for mutual protection and to exercise mission command. (See JP 4-0 for more information on joint logistics and basing and JP 3-10 for more on joint security areas.)

2-57. When a base camp expands to include clusters of sustainment, headquarters, and other supporting units, echelon commanders may designate a support area. These specific areas of operations facilitate the positioning, employment, and protection of resources required to sustain, enable, and control tactical operations. Army forces typically rely on a mix of bases and base camps to serve as intermediate staging bases, lodgments (subsequently developed into base camps or potentially bases), and forward operating bases. These bases and base camps deploy and employ landpower simultaneously to operational depth. They establish and maintain strategic reach for deploying forces and ensure sufficient operational reach to extend operations in time and space. (See paragraph 4-29 for a discussion of support areas.)

2-58. An intermediate staging base is a tailorable, temporary location used for staging forces, sustainment and/or extraction into and out of an operational area (JP 3-35). At the intermediate staging base, units are unloaded from intertheater lift, reassembled and integrated with their equipment, and then moved by intratheater lift into the area of operations. The theater army commander provides extensive support to Army forces transiting the base. The combatant commander may designate the theater army commander to command the base or provide a headquarters suitable for the task. Intermediate staging bases are established
near, but normally not in, the joint operations area. They often are located in the supported combatant commander’s area of responsibility. For land forces, intermediate staging bases may be located in the area of operations. However, if possible, they are established outside the range of direct and most indirect enemy fire systems and beyond the enemy’s political sphere of influence.

2-59. A base camp that expands to include an airfield may become a forward operating base. A forward operating base is an airfield used to support tactical operations without establishing full support facilities (JP 3-09.3). Forward operating bases may be used for an extended time and are often critical to security. During protracted operations, they may be further expanded and improved to establish a more permanent presence. The scale and complexity of a forward operating base, however, directly relate to the size of the force required to maintain it. A large forward operating base with extensive facilities requires a much larger security force than a smaller, austere base. Commanders weigh whether to expand and improve a forward operating base against the type and number of forces available to secure it, the expected length of the forward deployment, the force’s sustainment requirements, and the enemy threat.

2-60. A lodgment is a designated area in a hostile or potentially hostile operational area that, when seized and held, makes the continuous landing of troops and materiel possible and provides maneuver space for subsequent operations (JP 3-18). Identifying and preparing the initial lodgment significantly influences the conduct of an operation. Lodgments should expand to allow easy access to strategic sealift and airlift, offer adequate space for storage, facilitate transshipment of supplies and equipment, and be accessible to multiple lines of communications. Typically, deploying forces establish lodgments near key points of entry in the operational area that offer central access to air, land, and sea transportation hubs.

**RISK**

2-61. Risk is the probability and severity of loss linked to hazards. Risk, uncertainty, and chance are inherent in all military operations. When commanders accept risk, they create opportunities to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative and achieve decisive results. The willingness to incur risk is often the key to exposing enemy weaknesses that the enemy considers beyond friendly reach. Understanding risk requires accurate staff estimates and valid assumptions coupled with boldness and imagination. Successful commanders assess and mitigate risk continuously throughout the operations process.

2-62. Inadequate planning and preparation puts forces at risk and so does delaying action while waiting for perfect intelligence and synchronization. Reasonably estimating and intentionally accepting risk is fundamental to conducting operations and essential to mission command. Experienced commanders balance audacity and imagination against risk and uncertainty to strike at a time, at a place, and in a manner unexpected by enemy forces. This is the essence of surprise.

2-63. Commanders accept risks to create and maintain conditions necessary to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative and achieve decisive results. A good operational approach considers the balances of risk and uncertainty with friction and chance. Plans and orders should provide the flexibility commanders need for initiative and take advantage of opportunities in a highly competitive and dynamic environment.
Chapter 3
The Army’s Operational Concept

This chapter discusses the Army’s operational concept of unified land operations. It discusses the principles and tenets of unified land operations as well as decisive action.

THE GOAL OF UNIFIED LAND OPERATIONS

3-1. Unified land operations is the Army’s operational concept and contribution to unified action. Unified land operations are simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability or defense support of civil authorities tasks to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative to shape the operational environment, prevent conflict, consolidate gains, and win our Nation’s wars as part of unified action. The goal of unified land operations is to establish conditions that achieve the JFC’s end state by applying landpower as part of a unified action to defeat the enemy. Unified land operations is how the Army applies combat power through 1) simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability, or DSCA tasks, to 2) seize, retain, and exploit the initiative, and 3) consolidate gains. Military forces seek to prevent or deter threats through unified action, and, when necessary, poses the capability to defeat aggression.

DECISIVE ACTION

3-2. Decisive action is the continuous, simultaneous combinations of offensive, defensive, and stability or defense support of civil authorities tasks. Commanders seize, retain, and exploit the initiative while synchronizing their actions to achieve the best effects possible. Operations conducted outside the United States and its territories simultaneously combine three elements of decisive action—offense, defense, and stability. Within the United States and its territories, decisive action combines elements of DSCA and, as required, offense and defense to support homeland defense. (See table 3-1 on page 3-2.)

3-3. Decisive action begins with the commander’s intent and concept of operations. Decisive action provides direction for an entire operation. Commanders and staffs refine the concept of operations during planning and determine the proper allocation of resources and tasks. Throughout the operation, they may adjust the allocation of resources and tasks as conditions change.

3-4. The simultaneity of the decisive action is not absolute. The higher the echelon, the greater the possibility of simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability tasks. At lower echelons, an assigned task may require all the echelons’ combat power to execute a specific task. For example, in some form a higher echelon, such as a division, always performs offensive, defensive, and stability tasks simultaneously. Subordinate brigades perform some combination of offensive, defensive, and stability tasks, but they may not perform all three simultaneously.

3-5. For every organization assigned to an area of operations, implied or even specified minimum-essential stability tasks of security, food, water, shelter, and medical treatment always exist. If the organization cannot perform these tasks, it must either request additional resources from higher headquarters or request relief from those tasks. (See figure 3-1 on page 3-3.)
Table 3-1. Decisive action

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tasks:</th>
<th>Offense</th>
<th>Defense</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Movement to contact</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Mobile defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Attack</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Area defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Exploitation</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Retrograde</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Pursuit</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Purposes:</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Dislocate, isolate, disrupt, and destroy enemy forces</td>
<td>• Deter or defeat enemy offense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Seize key terrain</td>
<td>• Gain time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Deprive the enemy of resources</td>
<td>• Achieve economy of force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Refine intelligence</td>
<td>• Retain key terrain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Deceive and divert the enemy</td>
<td>• Protect the population, critical assets, and infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Provide a secure environment for stability tasks</td>
<td>• Refine intelligence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tasks:</th>
<th>Stability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Establish civil security</td>
<td>• Provide support for domestic disasters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Establish civil control</td>
<td>• Provide support for domestic chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear incidents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Restore essential services</td>
<td>• Provide support for domestic civilian law enforcement agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Support to governance</td>
<td>• Provide other designated support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Support to economic and infrastructure development</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Conduct security cooperation</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Purposes:</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Provide a secure environment</td>
<td>• Save lives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Secure land areas</td>
<td>• Restore essential services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Meet the critical needs of the population</td>
<td>• Maintain or restore law and order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Gain support for host-nation government</td>
<td>• Protect infrastructure and property</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Shape the environment for interagency and host-nation success</td>
<td>• Support maintenance or restoration of local government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Promote security, build partner capacity, and provide access</td>
<td>• Shape the environment for intergovernmental success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Refine intelligence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3-6. Unified land operations addresses combat between armed opponents as well as the conduct of operations amid populations. This requires Army forces to defeat the enemy while simultaneously shaping civil conditions. Winning battles and engagements is important, but not always the most significant task. Shaping civil conditions (with unified action partners) is as important to campaign success. In many joint operations, stability or DSCA tasks is more important than offensive and defensive tasks.

3-7. The emphasis on tasks changes with echelon, time, and location. In an operation dominated by stability, part of the force might conduct simultaneous offensive and defensive tasks in support of establishing stability. Within the United States, DSCA may be the only activity actually conducted. Simultaneous combinations of the tasks are the key to successful land operations in achieving the end state.
3-8. Operations require versatile, adaptive units and flexible leaders who exhibit sound judgment, primarily developed through realistic and challenging training. Managing training for decisive action challenges leaders at all echelons. This kind of training develops discipline, endurance, unit cohesion, tolerance for uncertainty, and mutual support. It prepares Soldiers and units to address ambiguities inherent in all operations.

3-9. Operational experience demonstrates that forces trained exclusively for offensive and defensive tasks are not as proficient at stability tasks and vice versa. Likewise, forces involved in protracted stability or DSCA tasks require intensive training to regain proficiency in offensive or defensive tasks before engaging in large-scale combat operations. Effective training reflects a balance among the tasks of decisive action to produce and sustain Soldier, leader, and unit proficiency in individual, collective, and mission-essential tasks.

**The Purpose of Simultaneity**

3-10. Simultaneity is the act of doing multiple things at the same time. Simultaneously performing multiple decisive action tasks entails a synchronized application of combat power. It requires the ability to conduct operations in depth and to integrate them so that their timing multiplies their effectiveness throughout an area of operations across multiple domains. Commanders must consider their entire area of operations, the enemy, and information collection activities when shaping the environment. With this synchronized combat power, they can conduct simultaneous operations that immobilize, suppress, or surprise the enemy. Such actions nullify the enemy’s ability to conduct synchronized, mutually supporting reactions. Simultaneity presents the enemy with multiple dilemmas. The enemy cannot focus on a single problem but must address multiple dilemmas that confront the enemy with more than it can deal with effectively.

3-11. The simultaneous execution of offensive, defensive, and stability tasks is not possible at every level. Higher echelons can assign simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability tasks to different subordinate formations. At lower echelons, one or two types of tasks may require all the echelons’ combat power to execute. A division or corps may conduct offensive, defensive, and stability tasks simultaneously in some form. Individual subordinate brigades may focus on some combination of offensive, defensive, and stability tasks in sequence.

3-12. Army forces increase the depth of their operations to support simultaneity. They increase depth in time and space through combined arms, economy of force, continuous reconnaissance, and joint capabilities. Army forces conduct operations across large areas forcing the enemy to react to multiple, potential friendly actions. Depth is important to security since it weakens the focus of enemy forces and restricts their freedom of movement. In DSCA and certain stability tasks, depth includes conducting operations that reach all citizens in the area of operations to bring relief as well as to instill hope. (Paragraph 3-66 introduces a discussion on depth as a tenet of unified land operations.)
TASKS OF DECISIVE ACTION

3-13. Decisive action requires simultaneous combinations offensive, defensive, and stability or DSCA tasks. Table 3-1 on page 3-2 lists the tasks associated with each element and the purposes of each task. Each task has numerous associated subordinate tasks. When combined with who (unit), when (time), where (location), and why (purpose), the tasks become mission statements.

Offensive Tasks

3-14. An offensive task is a task conducted to defeat and destroy enemy forces and seize terrain, resources, and population centers. Offensive tasks impose the commander’s will on the enemy. The offense is the most direct means of seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative to gain a physical and psychological advantage. In the offense, the decisive operation is a sudden action directed toward enemy weaknesses and capitalizing on speed, surprise, and shock. If that operation fails to destroy the enemy, operations continue until enemy forces are defeated. Executing offensive tasks compels the enemy to react, creating new or larger weaknesses the attacking force can exploit. (See ADRP 3-90 for a detailed discussion of offensive tasks.)

Defensive Tasks

3-15. A defensive task is a task conducted to defeat an enemy attack, gain time, economize forces, and develop conditions favorable for offensive or stability tasks. Normally the defense cannot achieve a decisive victory. However, it sets conditions for a counteroffensive or a counterattack that enables forces to regain the initiative. Defensive tasks are a counter to an enemy offensive action. They destroy attacks, defending as much of the attacking enemy as possible. They also preserve control over land, resources, and populations. The purpose of defensive tasks is to retain key terrain, guard populations, protect lines of communications, and protect critical capabilities against enemy attacks. Commanders can conduct defensive tasks to gain time and economize forces so offensive tasks can be executed elsewhere. (See ADRP 3-90 for a detailed discussion of defensive tasks.)

Stability Tasks

3-16. Stability tasks are tasks conducted as part of operations outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief (ADRP 3-07). These tasks support governance by a host nation, an interim government, or a military government. Stability tasks involve coercive and constructive actions. They help to establish or maintain a safe and secure environment and facilitate reconciliation among local or regional adversaries. Stability tasks assist in building relationships among unified action partners and promote U.S. security interests. Stability tasks can help establish political, legal, social, and economic institutions while supporting transition to a legitimate host-nation governance. Stability tasks cannot succeed if they only react to enemy initiatives. Stability tasks must maintain the initiative by pursuing objectives that resolve causes of instability. Commanders are legally required to provide minimum-essential stability tasks when controlling populated areas of operations. These essential services provide minimal levels of security, food, water, shelter, and medical treatment. (See ADRP 3-07 for a detailed discussion of stability.)

Defense Support of Civil Authorities Tasks

3-17. Defense support of civil authorities is support provided by United States Federal military forces, Department of Defense civilians, Department of Defense contract personnel, Department of Defense component assets, and National Guard forces (when the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the governors of the affected states, elects and requests to use those forces in Title 32, United States Code, status) in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic activities, or from qualifying entities for special events (DODD 3025.18). DSCA is a task executed in the homeland and U.S. territories. DSCA is conducted in support of another primary agency, lead federal agency, or local authority. When DSCA is authorized, it consists of four tasks (see table 3-1 on page 3-2). (See DODD 3025.18 for the full name of each task.) National Guard forces—Title 32 or state active forces under the command and control of the governor and the adjutant general—are usually the
first forces to respond on behalf of state authorities. When Federal military forces are employed for DSCA activities, they remain under Federal military command and control at all times. (See DODD 3025.18 for a detailed discussion of DSCA tasks. See JP 3-28 and ADRP 3-28 for discussions of DSCA.)

**HOMELAND DEFENSE AND DECISIVE ACTION**

3-18. *Homeland defense* is the protection of United States sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical infrastructure against external threats and aggression or other threats as directed by the President (JP 3-27). The Department of Defense has lead responsibility for homeland defense. The strategy for homeland defense (and DSCA) calls for defending the U.S. territory against attack by state and nonstate actors through an active, layered defense that aims to deter and defeat aggression abroad and simultaneously protects the homeland. The Army supports this strategy with capabilities in forward regions of the world, geographic approaches to U.S. territory, and within the U.S. homeland.

3-19. In homeland defense, Army forces work closely with federal, state, territorial, tribal, local, and private agencies. Land domain homeland defense could consist of offensive and defensive tasks as part of decisive action. Homeland defense is a defense-in-depth that relies on collection, analysis, and sharing of information and intelligence; strategic and regional deterrence; military presence in forward regions; and the ability to rapidly generate and project warfighting capabilities to defend the United States, its allies, and its interests. This defense may include support to civil law enforcement; antiterrorism and force protection; counterdrug; air and missile defense; chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives; and defensive cyberspace operations. It can also include security cooperation with other partners to build an integrated and mutually supportive concept of protection.

**TRANSITIONING IN DECISIVE ACTION**

3-20. Conducting decisive action involves more than simultaneous execution of tasks. Commanders and staffs must consider their units’ capabilities and capacities relative to each task. Commanders consider and balance the tasks of decisive action while preparing their commander’s intent and concept of operations. They determine which tasks to accomplish simultaneously and which require phasing, whether additional resources are necessary, and how to transition from one task to another.

3-21. Transitions between tasks of decisive action require careful assessment, planning, and unit preparation. Commanders first assess the situation to determine applicable tasks and the priority for each. When conditions change, commanders adjust the combination of decisive action tasks in the concept of operations. When an operation is phased, the plan includes these changes. The relative weight given to each element varies with conditions. This weight is reflected in tasks assigned to subordinates, resource allocation, and task organization.

3-22. Commanders consider the concurrent conduct of each task in every phase of an operation. Figure 3-2 on page 3-6 illustrates combinations and weighting of the tasks across the phases of a joint campaign or operation. Phases shown are examples. An actual campaign may name and array phases differently. Operations do not necessarily move linearly through the phases. For example, a unit may move from stability to seizing the initiative with little or no time for deterrence. (See JP 3-0 for a discussion on joint phasing.)

3-23. Unanticipated changes or an improved understanding of an operational environment may result in commanders reframing the problem and adapting the operation. Unforeseen success resulting in collapse of enemy opposition illustrates one unanticipated change. Another example is degradation in peace operations resulting in a transition to defensive or offensive tasks to reestablish stability. Commanders need to adjust the task organization to meet changing requirements. In some instances, they incorporate additional forces to assist in the conduct of operations. When transitioning in operations, subordinate commanders must clearly understand the higher commander’s intent, concept of operations, and desired end state. Successful commanders understand which transitions involve risks, how much risk to accept, and where to accept it.
SEIZE, RETAIN, AND EXPLOIT THE INITIATIVE

3-24. Army forces seize, retain, and exploit the initiative by forcing the enemy to respond to friendly action. By presenting the enemy multiple dilemmas across multiple domains, commanders force the enemy to react continuously until driven into an untenable position. Exploiting the initiative pressures enemy commanders to abandon their preferred options, react to friendly actions, and make mistakes. As the enemy makes mistakes or weakens, friendly forces seize opportunities that create new avenues for exploitation. This exploitation with combat power destroys and defeats enemy forces, consolidates gains, and protects populations, friendly forces, and infrastructure.

3-25. Commanders seize the initiative by acting across multiple domains simultaneously. Without action, seizing the initiative is impossible. Faced with an uncertain situation, commanders naturally tend to hesitate and gather more information to reduce uncertainty. Waiting for more information might reduce uncertainty but never eliminates it. Waiting for perfect friendly situational awareness and synchronization provides an adaptive enemy the time to seize or regain the initiative. Successful commanders manage uncertainty better by developing the situation through action.

3-26. Seizing the initiative means setting and dictating the terms of action throughout the operation. Commanders plan to seize the initiative as early as possible. Effective planning determines where, when, and how that happens. Enemies will actively try to retain the initiative and disrupt friendly plans, so good plans rapidly executed are fundamental to seizing the initiative. During execution, commanders and staffs recognize and exploit opportunities to attack and deceive enemy command and control elements to prevent their synchronization of combat power and achieve surprise. Seizing the initiative usually requires accepting risk. Commanders and staffs assess if they have the initiative and determine how to seize it if they do not. The following conditions generally indicate that friendly forces have the initiative:

- Friendly forces are no longer decisively engaged or threatened with decisive engagement.
- Subordinate commanders are able to mass combat power or concentrate forces at times and places of their choosing.
- Enemy forces no longer offer effective resistance and do not appear capable of reestablishing resistance.
Friendly forces encounter lighter-than-anticipated enemy resistance or large numbers of prisoners.

Friendly rates of advance suddenly accelerate or casualty rates suddenly drop.

3-27. Retaining the initiative requires sustained, relentless pressure on the enemy. Commanders do this by synchronizing the warfighting functions to present enemy commanders with continuously changing combinations of combat power at a tempo they cannot effectively counter. Commanders and staffs use information collection assets to identify enemy attempts to regain the initiative. Effective information management to process information quickly is essential for staying inside the enemy’s decision-making cycle. Combined with effective planning, information management helps commanders anticipate enemy actions and develop branches, sequels, or adjustments.

CONSOLIDATE GAINS

3-28. Consolidate gains are activities to make enduring any temporary operational success and set the conditions for a stable environment allowing for a transition of control to legitimate authorities. Army forces exploit operational success by consolidating gains for the JFC. Consolidate gains is an integral part of winning and achieving success across the conflict continuum and the range of military operations. It is the follow-through to achieve the commander’s intent and essential to retaining the initiative over determined enemies and adversaries. To consolidate gains, Army forces reinforce and integrate the efforts of all unified action partners.

3-29. Consolidate gains is not a mission. It is an Army strategic role defined by the purpose of the tasks necessary to achieve enduring political outcomes to military operations and, as such, represents a capability that Army forces provide to the JFC. Army forces consolidate gains by executing area security and stability tasks when the operational emphasis in an area of operations shifts from large-scale combat operations. Consolidating gains enables a transition from the occupation of a territory and control of populations by Army forces—that occurred as a result of military operations—to the transfer of control to legitimate authorities. Activities to consolidate gains occur across the range of military operations and often continue through all phases of a specific operation.

3-30. Army forces generally consolidate gains to provide both security and stability for the host nation and the civilian population. This includes defeating remnants of enemy forces, relocating displaced civilians, establishing law and order, providing humanitarian assistance, and securing key infrastructure to enable services. Army forces must be able to accomplish such activities while sustaining, repositioning, and reorganizing forces to continue operations. Ending enemy resistance and preventing the enemy from prolonging the conflict are the first priorities during operations to consolidate gains. Doing so may require planning for additional forces.

3-31. Army forces must analyze the host nation’s capability and capacity to provide services as well as determine the ability of other U.S. government agencies, international agencies, NGOs, and contractors to provide support. The goal is to address sources of conflict, foster host-nation resiliencies, and create conditions that enable sustainable peace and security.

3-32. Army forces must deliberately plan and prepare for consolidating gains to capitalize on operational success prior to an operation. Planning should address changes to task organization and the additional assets required in a specific situation. Additional engineer, military police, civil affairs, and medical capabilities typically support the security and stability of large areas. In some instances, Army forces will be in charge of integrating and synchronizing activities, in others the Army will be in support.

3-33. To consolidate gains, Army forces take specific actions. These actions include—

- **Consolidation**: Forces organize and strengthen their newly occupied positions so that commanders can use them for subsequent operations.
- **Area security**: Forces conduct security tasks to protect friendly forces, routes, critical infrastructure, and populations as well as enable actions within an assigned area of operations. This may require offensive action to defeat bypassed enemy units and secure enemy bases, equipment, and ammunition.
Chapter 3

- **Stability tasks**: Forces first conduct minimum-essential stability tasks, then establish a safe and secure environment to provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.

- **Influence over local and regional audiences (when authorized)**: Commanders ensure that friendly forces communicate credible narratives to shape the behavior of the local population in desirable ways. It is important not allow the enemy or adversaries opportunities to exploit information in ways that prolong the conflict.

- **Security from external threats**: Commanders ensure sufficient combat power is positioned within their area of operations to prevent counterattacks or infiltration of forces that could disrupt consolidation of gains.

3-34. Army forces routinely conduct consolidation upon occupying a position on the battlefield or achieving success. This is different from the consolidation of gains. Consolidation organizes and strengthen forces in a newly captured position so that it can be used against the enemy. Normally, an attacking unit tries to exploit success, but in some situations, the unit may have to consolidate before exploiting its gains. Consolidation activities include—

- Conducting reconnaissance.
- Establishing security.
- Eliminating enemy pockets of resistance.
- Positioning forces to enable them to conduct a hasty defense by blocking possible enemy counterattacks.
- Adjusting plans for fire.
- Preparing for potential additional missions.

(See FM 3-90-1 for an additional discussion of consolidation.)

3-35. When consolidating gains, commanders establish and sustain security is during transitions. Army forces conduct continuous reconnaissance to gain or maintain contact with remaining enemy forces to enable their defeat and retain the initiative. Consolidating gains may include offensive tasks to eliminate isolated or bypassed threat forces, defensive tasks to protect lines of communications, and the processing of enemy prisoners and civilian detainees. Commanders ensure that forces are properly task organized for the tasks required. Commanders maintain communications with the population to ensure they do not interfere with military operations and help them see how ongoing military actions may benefit them in the future. Capabilities such as military information support operations, public affairs, and combat camera assist in this effort.

3-36. Army forces are responsible for the provision of minimum-essential stability tasks: provide security, food, water, shelter, and medical treatment. However, Army forces may not conduct all the essential tasks if another organization exists that can adequately conduct those tasks. Army forces execute their primary stability tasks as requirements and capabilities evolve. The military retains the lead to establish civil security through the conduct of security force assistance in all cases. The lead for the other all tasks eventually transfers to another military or civilian organization, although the Army may retain a supporting role. (For more information on stability tasks, see ADRP 3-07.)

3-37. Consolidating gains may occur over a significant period and involve several changes in focus and emphasis as conditions change. An initial emphasis on defeating threat conventional forces will shift to more broadly based area security of populations and infrastructure. Eventually the emphasis and focus changes to meeting the needs of the population, influencing their perceptions, and allowing for a transition to a legitimate authority. Transitions are not generally abrupt, and units will manage different stability and security tasks concurrently until operations are complete.

**PRINCIPLES OF UNIFIED LAND OPERATIONS**

3-38. A principle is a comprehensive and fundamental rule or an assumption of central importance that guides how an organization or function approaches and thinks about the conduct of operations (ADP 1-01). By integrating the six principles of unified land operations—mission command, develop the situation through action, combined arms, adherence to the law of war, establish and maintain security, and create multiple
dilemmas for the enemy—Army commanders increase the probability of operational and strategic success. Success requires fully integrating U.S. military operations with the efforts of unified action partners. Success also requires commanders to exercise disciplined initiative to rapidly exploit opportunities that favorably develop the situation through action and create multiple dilemmas for the enemy.

**MISSION COMMAND**

3-39. Mission command is the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations (ADP 6-0). Mission command is the Army’s leadership philosophy. It blends the art of command and the science of control while integrating the warfighting functions to conduct the tasks of decisive action. Mission command has six fundamental principles:

- Build cohesive teams.
- Create shared understanding and mutual trust.
- Provide a clear commander’s intent.
- Exercise disciplined initiative.
- Use mission orders.
- Accept prudent risk.

(See ADRP 6-0 for a detailed discussion of the fundamental principles of mission command.)

3-40. Commanders understand that they do not operate independently but as part of a larger force. They integrate and synchronize operations through the exercise of mission command. To achieve the overall objective of the operation, they integrate and synchronize their actions with the rest of the force. Commanders create shared understanding and common purpose through repetitive training, education, and collaborative dialogue with subordinates to facilitate unity of effort. They provide a clear commander’s intent and use mission orders to assign tasks, allocate resources, and issue broad guidance.

3-41. Commander’s intent is a clear and concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the desired military end state that supports mission command, provides focus to the staff, and helps subordinate and supporting commanders act to achieve the commander’s desired results without further orders, even when the operation does not unfold as planned (JP 3-0). Guided by commander’s intent and purpose of the mission, subordinates use disciplined initiative and take appropriate action to best accomplish the mission without needing new orders. Subordinates acting on the commander’s intent can develop the situation in ways that exploit unforeseen opportunities in a timely manner when communication is difficult or not possible.

3-42. Mission command requires commanders to convey a commander’s intent and concept of operations. Commanders should personally articulate both, clearly and succinctly. These are essential in large-scale combat operations where multiple operational and mission variables interact with the lethal application of combat power by subordinate echelons across significant geographical areas. Such dynamic interaction often compels subordinate commanders to make difficult decisions in unforeseen circumstances.

3-43. Mission command emphasizes the critical contributions of leaders at every echelon. It recognizes that the best understanding comes from a synthesis of information and an understanding among all echelons and unified action partners. Bottom-up input is as important as top-down guidance. This open dialog contributes to a shared situational understanding and purpose. It facilitates transition among offensive, defensive, and stability or DSCA tasks without further guidance in time-constrained, dynamic environments.

3-44. Mission command fosters adaptability and a greater understanding of the environment. Adaptability is a function of knowledge and critical thinking. It demands comfort with ambiguity and uncertainty, a willingness to accept prudent risk, and the ability to rapidly adjust while continuously assessing the situation.
**DEVELOP THE SITUATION THROUGH ACTION**

3-45. During operations, commanders develop the situation through action. Developing the situation requires information. Commanders fight for information while in contact with the enemy and gather information through close association with a population. Developing the situation through action to collect information is inherently part of displaying disciplined initiative. Commanders enhance situational awareness and understanding by assigning information collection tasks (reconnaissance, surveillance, security operations, and intelligence operations) to collect information requirements.

3-46. Often information can only be provided by close combat that forces the enemy to reveal unit locations and intent. When units encounter an enemy force or an obstacle, then they must quickly determine the nature of the threat they face. Units share the enemy’s dispositions, activities, and movements, along with an assessment, to their higher headquarters and with the other units in their formation.

3-47. During planning, commanders identify information gaps, develop information requirements, and then assign collection tasks within a given area. Information collection and analysis allows staffs to develop options for the commander who uses them to further seize opportunities and maintain initiative.

3-48. Commanders take enemy capabilities and reaction times into account when making decisions. They ensure that plans delegate decision-making authority to the lowest echelon possible to obtain faster and more suitable decisions in battle. Subordinates use their initiative to make decisions that further their higher commander’s intent.

3-49. During execution, commanders make decisions quickly, usually with incomplete information. Commanders who can make and implement decisions faster than the enemy, even to a small degree, gain an accruing advantage that becomes significant over time. Commanders should not delay a decision in hopes of finding a perfect solution to a battlefield problem. By the time the slower commander decides and acts, the faster one has already altered the tactical situation, making the slower one’s actions less effective. The faster commander maintains the initiative and dictates the tempo of operations.

3-50. To make timely decisions, commanders must understand the effects of their decisions in a complex operational environment. They must understand enemy capabilities, the terrain and weather, and their impact on operations. They must also understand the population. Understanding an operational environment includes civil considerations—such as the population (with demographics and culture), the government, economics, NGOs, and history—among other factors.

**COMBINED ARMS**

3-51. *Combined arms* is the synchronized and simultaneous application of all elements of combat power that together achieve an effect greater than if each element was used separately or sequentially. Combined arms integrates leadership, information, and each of the warfighting functions as well as joint capabilities. Used destructively, combined arms integrates different capabilities so that counteracting one makes the enemy vulnerable to another. Used constructively, combined arms uses all assets available to multiply the effectiveness and efficiency of Army capabilities used in stability or DSCA tasks.

3-52. Combined arms uses the capabilities of all Army, joint, and multinational weapons systems—in the air, land, maritime, space, and cyberspace domains—in complementary and reinforcing ways. Complementary capabilities protect the weaknesses of one system or organization with the capabilities of a different one. During maneuver, the fires warfighting function complements the movement and maneuver warfighting function. Ground maneuver can make enemy forces vulnerable to joint weapon systems, while joint capabilities can enable maneuver. Electronic warfare assets prevent the enemy from communicating or relaying information about friendly maneuver. Information obtained from NGOs can facilitate effective distribution of supplies during humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations.

3-53. Reinforcing capabilities combine similar systems or capabilities within the same warfighting function to increase the function’s overall capabilities. In urban operations, for example, infantry, aviation, and armor units (movement and maneuver) working closely together reinforce the protection, maneuver, and direct fire capabilities of each unit type while creating cascading dilemmas for the enemy. The infantry protects tanks from enemy infantry and antitank systems while tanks provide protection and firepower for the infantry. Attack helicopters maneuver above buildings to protect ground formations, while other aircraft help sustain,
extract, or air assault ground forces. Army fires units can be reinforced by close air support, air interdiction, air defense, and naval surface fire support that greatly increases both the mass and range of fires available during operations.

**ADHERENCE TO LAW OF WAR**

3-54. The *law of war* is that part of international law that regulates the conduct of armed hostilities (JP 1-04). The law of war’s evolution was largely humanitarian and designed to reduce the evils of war. The main purposes of the law of war are to—

- Protect combatants, noncombatants, and civilians from unnecessary suffering.
- Provide certain fundamental protections for persons who fall into the hands of the enemy, particularly prisoners of war, civilians, and military wounded, sick, and shipwrecked.
- Facilitate the restoration of peace.
- Assist military commanders in ensuring the disciplined and efficient use of military force.
- Preserve the professionalism and humanity of combatants.

3-55. Soldiers consider five important principles that govern the law of war when planning and executing operations: military necessity, humanity, distinction, proportionality, and honor. Three interdependent principles—military necessity, humanity, and honor—provide the foundation for other law of war principles—such as proportionality and distinction. Law of war principles work as interdependent and reinforcing parts of a coherent system. Military necessity justifies certain actions necessary to defeat the enemy as quickly and efficiently as possible. Humanity forbids actions that cause unnecessary suffering. Proportionality requires that even when actions may be justified by military necessity, such actions may not be unreasonable or excessive. Distinction underpins the parties’ responsibility to distinguish between the armed forces and the civilian population. Lastly, honor supports the entire system and gives parties confidence in it.

3-56. *Rules of engagement* are directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered (JP 1-04). Rules of engagement always recognize the inherent right of self-defense. These rules vary between operations and types of units in the same area of operations, and may change during an operation. Adherence to them ensures Soldiers act consistently with international law, national policy, and military regulations.

3-57. Soldiers deployed to a combat zone overseas follow rules of engagement established by the Secretary of Defense and adjusted for theater conditions by the JFC. Within the United States and its territories, Soldiers adhere to rules for the use of force. Rules for the use of force consist of directives issued to guide U.S. forces during various operations. These directives may take the form of execute orders, deployment orders, memoranda of agreement, or plans. (See JP 3-28 for discussion on rules for the use of force.) Rules of engagement are permissive measures intended to allow the maximum use of destructive combat power appropriate for the mission. Rules for the use of force are restrictive measures intended to allow only the minimum force necessary to accomplish the mission. The underlying principle is a “continuum of force,” a carefully graduated level of response determined by the behavior of possible threats.

3-58. Successful operations require Soldiers to use discipline when applying lethal and nonlethal actions. Threats challenge the morals and ethics of Soldiers. Often an enemy does not respect international laws or conventions and commits atrocities simply to provoke retaliation in kind. Any loss of discipline on the part of friendly forces is likely to be distorted and exploited into propaganda, and in turn magnified through the media. It is crucial that all personnel operate within applicable U.S., international, and in some cases host-nation laws and regulations. Ensuring friendly forces remain within legal, moral, and ethical boundaries is a leadership concern and priority. This challenge rests heavily on small-unit and company-grade leaders charged with maintaining good order and discipline within their respective units. The Soldier’s Rules in AR 350-1 distill the essence of the law of war. (Table 3-2 on page 3-12 lists the Soldier’s Rules.)
Table 3-2. The Soldier’s rules

- Soldiers fight only enemy combatants.
- Soldiers do not harm enemies who surrender. They disarm them and turn them over to their superior.
- Soldiers do not kill or torture any personnel in their custody.
- Soldiers collect and care for the wounded, whether friend or foe.
- Soldiers do not attack medical personnel, facilities, or equipment.
- Soldiers destroy no more than the mission requires.
- Soldiers treat civilians humanely.
- Soldiers do not steal. Soldiers respect private property and possessions.
- Soldiers should do their best to prevent violations of the law of war.
- Soldiers report all violations of the law of war to their superior.

Establish and Maintain Security

3-59. Army forces conduct area security to ensure freedom of movement and action and to deny the enemy the ability to disrupt operations. Commanders combine reconnaissance, offensive, defensive, and stability tasks to protect friendly forces, populations, infrastructure, and activities critical to mission accomplishment. Army forces integrate with partner military, law enforcement, and civil capabilities to establish and maintain security. The Army’s ability to establish control is critical to consolidating gains in the wake of successful military operations.

3-60. Security operations prevent surprise, reduce uncertainty, and provide early warning of enemy operations. Warning of enemy operations provides forces with time and maneuver space with which to react and develop the situation. Security operations prevent enemies from discovering the friendly plan and protect the force from unforeseen enemy actions. Security elements focus on preventing the enemy from gathering essential elements of friendly information. Security is a dynamic effort that anticipates and thwarts enemy collection efforts. When successful, security operations allow the force to maintain the initiative.

Create Multiple Dilemmas for the Enemy

3-61. Simultaneous operations across multiple domains—conducted in depth and supported by military deception—present the enemy with multiple dilemmas. These operations degrade enemy freedom of action, reduce enemy flexibility and endurance, and upset enemy plans and coordination. Such operations place critical enemy functions at risk and deny the enemy the ability to synchronize or generate combat power. The application of capabilities in a complementary and reinforcing fashion creates more problems than the enemy commander can hope to solve, which erodes both enemy effectiveness and the will to fight.

3-62. Forcible entry operations can create multiple dilemmas by creating threats that exceed the enemy’s capability to respond. The capability to project power across operational distances allows forces to present the enemy with sudden and unanticipated problems for which there is no easy solution. Rapid tactical maneuver to operational depth to exploit a penetration generates similar effects.

3-63. Creating multiple dilemmas requires the recognition of opportunities to exploit. Understanding enemy dispositions and capabilities, as well as the characteristics of the terrain and population, informs situational understanding and course of action development. Employing mutually supporting forces along different axes to strike simultaneously from unexpected directions creates dilemmas, particularly when Army and joint capabilities converge against enemy forces in multiple domains. Commanders seek every opportunity to force the enemy to fight in different directions against massed capabilities at the time and location of their choosing.
TENETS OF UNIFIED LAND OPERATIONS

3-64. Tenets of operations are desirable attributes that should be built into all plans and operations and are directly related to the Army’s operational concept (ADP 1-01). Tenets of unified land operations describe the Army’s approach to generating and applying combat power across the range of military operations during decisive action. An operation is a military action, consisting of two or more related tactical actions designed to achieve a strategic objective in whole or in part. A tactical action is a battle or engagement employing lethal and nonlethal actions designed for a specific purpose relative to the enemy, the terrain, friendly forces, or other entities. Operations can include an attack to seize a piece of terrain or destroy an enemy unit, the defense of a population, and the training of other militaries to assist security forces as part of building partner capacity. In the homeland, Army forces apply the tenets of operations when supporting civil authorities to save lives, alleviate suffering, and protect property. Army operations are characterized by four tenets:

- Simultaneity.
- Depth.
- Synchronization.
- Flexibility.

SIMULTANEITY

3-65. Simultaneity is the execution of related and mutually supporting tasks at the same time across multiple locations and domains. Army forces operating simultaneously across the air, land, maritime, space, and cyberspace domains presents dilemmas to adversaries and enemies, while reassuring allies and influencing neutrals. The simultaneous application of joint and combined arms capabilities across the range of military operations overwhelms the enemy physically and psychologically. Simultaneity requires creating shared understanding and purpose through collaboration with all elements of the friendly force. Commanders balance tempo and momentum to produce simultaneous results throughout their areas of operations.

DEPTH

3-66. Depth is the extension of operations in time, space, or purpose to achieve definitive results. Army forces engage the enemy throughout their depth, preventing the effective employment of reserves, and disrupting command and control, logistics, and other capabilities not in direct contact with friendly forces. Operations in depth can disrupt the enemy’s decision cycle. They contribute to protection by destroying enemy capabilities before the enemy can use them. Empowering subordinates to act with initiative decentralizes decision making and increases operational tempo to achieve greater depth during operations.

3-67. Cyberspace operations, space-based capabilities, and military information support operations provide opportunities to engage adversaries and enemies across the depth of their formations. Each have planning considerations with regard to timing, authorities, and effects relative to physical actions in the land domain which should be factored into friendly courses of action.

SYNCHRONIZATION

3-68. Synchronization is the arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive place and time (JP 2-0). Synchronization is not the same as simultaneity; it is the ability to execute multiple related and mutually supporting tasks in different locations at the same time. These actions produce greater effects than executing each in isolation. For example, synchronization of information collection, obstacles, direct fires, and indirect fires results in the destruction of an enemy formation during a defense. When conducting offensive tasks, synchronizing forces along multiple lines of operations temporarily disrupts the enemy organization and creates opportunities for exploitation.

3-69. Information networks and commander’s intent enable synchronization. Networks facilitate situational awareness and rapid communication. Subordinate and adjacent units use their understanding of the commander’s intent to synchronize their actions with other units without direct control from higher headquarters. Neither networks nor commander’s intent guarantee synchronization, but when used together they provide a powerful tool for leaders to synchronize their efforts.
3-70. Commanders determine the degree of control necessary to synchronize their operations. They balance synchronization with agility and initiative, never surrendering the initiative for the sake of synchronization. Excessive synchronization can lead to too much control, which limits the initiative of subordinates and undermines mission command.

FLEXIBILITY

3-71. **Flexibility** is the employment of a versatile mix of capabilities, formations, and equipment for conducting operations. To achieve tactical, operational, and strategic success, commanders must be able to adapt to conditions as they change and employ forces in a variety of ways. Flexibility facilitates collaborative planning and decentralized execution. Leaders learn from experience (their own and that of others) and apply new knowledge to each situation. Flexible plans help units adapt quickly to changing circumstances in operations.

3-72. Flexibility and innovation are essential elements of an operation as are creative and adaptive leaders. Army forces continuously adapt to changes in an operational environment. Such adaptation enhances flexibility across the range of military operations. Army forces require flexibility in thought, plans, and operations to succeed.

SUCCESSFUL EXECUTION OF UNIFIED LAND OPERATIONS

3-73. Execution of unified land operations requires the following:
- A clear commander’s intent and concept of operations that establishes the role of each element and its contribution to accomplishing the mission.
- A flexible mission command system.
- A shared understanding of an operational environment and the purpose of the operation.
- Aggressive information collection and intelligence analysis.
- Aggressive planning for, and when authorized, execution of cyberspace operations.
- Aggressive security operations.
- The ability to rapidly task organize.
- Disciplined initiative.
- The ability to move quickly.
- Planned and responsive sustainment.
- Combat power applied through combined arms.
- Well-trained, cohesive teams and bold, imaginative leaders.
- The acceptance of prudent risk.
- An ability to coordinate operations with unified action partners.
- An ability to consolidate gains.

3-74. Throughout an operation, commanders constantly adapt and perform many tasks simultaneously. Commanders change tactics, modify their exercise of mission command, change task organization, and adjust the weight placed on each task of decisive action. Doing so keeps the force focused on accomplishing the mission and helps it to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. Commanders base decisions on their understanding of the situation, available resources, and the force’s ability to execute. Commanders assess the progress of ongoing operations, changes in the situation, and the force’s combat effectiveness. Commanders not only assess how well a current operation is accomplishing the mission, but also how its conduct is shaping the situation for subsequent missions.
Chapter 4
Operations Structure

Chapter 4 discusses the operational framework that enables commanders to visualize and describe operations. It begins with the operations structure as a whole. Then it discusses the operations process. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the Army operational framework.

CONSTRUCT FOR OPERATIONS STRUCTURE

4-1. The operations structure consists of the operations process, warfighting functions, and the operational framework. This is the Army’s common construct for unified land operations. It allows Army leaders to organize efforts rapidly, effectively, and in a manner commonly understood across the Army. The operations process provides a broadly defined approach to developing and executing operations. The warfighting functions provide a common organization for critical functions. The operational framework provides Army leaders with basic conceptual options for arraying forces and visualizing and describing operations.

OPERATIONS PROCESS

4-2. The operations process is a commander-led activity informed by mission command. It consists of the major mission command activities performed during operations: planning, preparing, executing, and continuously assessing the operation. These activities may be sequential or simultaneous. They are rarely discrete and often involve a great deal of overlap. Commanders use the operations process to drive the planning necessary to understand, visualize, and describe their unique operational environments; make and articulate decisions; and direct, lead, and assess military operations. (See ADRP 5-0 for a detailed discussion of the operations process.)

4-3. Planning is the art and science of understanding a situation, envisioning a desired future, and laying out effective ways of bringing that future about (ADP 5-0). Planning consists of two separate but interrelated components: a conceptual component and a detailed component. Successful planning requires the integration of both components. Army leaders employ three methodologies for planning: the Army design methodology, the military decisionmaking process, and troop leading procedures (see paragraphs 4-14 through 4-18). Commanders determine how much of each methodology to use based on the scope of the problem, their familiarity with the methodology, the echelon, and the time available.

4-4. Preparation consists of activities that units perform to improve their ability to execute an operation. Preparation creates conditions that improve friendly forces’ opportunities for success. It requires commander, staff, unit, and Soldier actions to ensure the force is trained, equipped, and ready to execute operations. Preparation activities help commanders, staffs, and Soldiers understand a situation and their roles in upcoming operations as well as set conditions for successful execution.

4-5. Execution puts a plan into action by applying combat power to accomplish the mission and by using situational understanding to assess progress and make execution and adjustment decisions. In execution, commanders and staffs, focus their efforts on translating decisions into actions. They apply combat power to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative to gain and maintain a position of relative advantage. This is the essence of unified land operations.

4-6. Finally, assessment is determination of the progress toward accomplishing a task, creating a condition, or achieving an objective (JP 3-0). Assessment precedes and then occurs during the other activities of the operations process. Assessment involves deliberately comparing forecasted outcomes with actual events to
determine the overall effectiveness of force employment. Assessment helps the commander determine progress toward achieving the desired end state, attaining objectives, and performing tasks.

4-7. While units execute numerous tasks throughout the operations process, commanders and staffs have responsibility for special tasks. Commanders and staffs plan and coordinate the following continuous activities:

- Liaison.
- Information collection.
- Security operations.
- Protection.
- Terrain management.
- Airspace control.

4-8. Liaison is that contact or intercommunication maintained between elements of military forces or other agencies to ensure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action. Units most often use it for establishing and maintaining close communication. Liaison continuously enables direct, physical communication between commands of equal level of authority (peers) or from a lower command to its higher command. Commanders use liaison during operations to help facilitate communication between organizations, preserve freedom of action, and maintain flexibility.

4-9. **Information collection** is an activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and employment of sensors and assets as well as the processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations (FM 3-55). Information collection is the acquiring of information and the supply of this information to the analyzing and utilizing elements. It integrates the functions of the intelligence and operations to answer the commander’s critical information requirements. Joint operations refer to this as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.

4-10. **Security operations** are those operations undertaken by a commander to provide early and accurate warning of enemy operations, to provide the force being protected with time and maneuver space within which to react to the enemy, and to develop the situation to allow the commander to effectively use the protected force (ADRP 3-90). The five forms of security operations are screen, guard, cover, area security, and local security. Of these forms, local security is the most resource intensive for units in the deep area (such as reconnaissance forces) and units supporting a deep operation (for example, units establishing a forward refueling and rearming point or field artillery units in forward positioning areas). Planners may augment these units by attaching additional security elements (for example, infantry or military police units) or assign tasks to subordinate brigades to provide local security. (See FM 3-90-2 for a detailed discussion of security operations.)

4-11. **Protection** is preservation of the effectiveness and survivability of mission-related military and nonmilitary personnel, equipment, facilities, information, and infrastructure deployed or located within or outside the boundaries of a given operational area (JP 3-0). It is both a warfighting function and a continuous activity during the operations process. It integrates all protection capabilities to secure routes, prevent casualties, and protect forces. Protection preserves capability, momentum, and tempo. Synchronizing, integrating, and organizing protection capabilities and resources throughout the operations process preserve combat power and mitigates the effects of threats and hazards.

4-12. **Terrain management** is the process of allocating terrain by establishing areas of operation, designating assembly areas, and specifying locations for units and activities to deconflict activities that might interfere with each other (ADRP 5-0). Throughout the operations process, commanders manage terrain within the boundaries of their assigned areas of operations. The operations officer, with support from the staff, manages terrain to deconflict operations and control movements to ensure maximum freedom of action for subordinate elements.

4-13. **Airspace control** is capabilities and procedures used to increase operational effectiveness by promoting the safe, efficient, and flexible use of airspace (JP 3-52). Airspace control provides expertise on methods to maximize airspace use for information collection, targeting, and protection purposes. Throughout the operations process, commanders and staffs must integrate and synchronize ground and air elements and
warfighting functions within the area of operations. Airspace control establishes both positive and procedural controls to maximize freedom of action and facilitate the simultaneity of air-ground operations and joint fires.

**ARMY DESIGN METHODOLOGY**

4-14. *Army design methodology* is a methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe problems and approaches to solving them (ADP 5-0). The Army design methodology is useful as an aid to conceptual thinking about unfamiliar problems. To produce executable plans, commanders integrate the Army design methodology with the detailed planning typically associated with the military decisionmaking process. Commanders who use the Army design methodology may gain a greater understanding of an operational environment and its problems. Once they have an understanding of the environment, they can better visualize an appropriate operational approach. This greater understanding allows commanders to provide a clear commander’s intent and concept of operations.

4-15. Army design methodology is iterative, collaborative, and continuous. As the operations process unfolds, the commander, staff, subordinates, and other partners continue collaboration to improve their shared understanding. An improved understanding may lead to modifications to the commander’s operational approach or an entirely new approach altogether. (See ATP 5-0.1 for more information on Army design methodology.)

**THE MILITARY DECISIONMAKING PROCESS**

4-16. The military decisionmaking process is an iterative planning methodology. It integrates activities of the commander, staff, subordinate headquarters, and other partners. This integration enables them to understand the situation and mission; develop, analyze, and compare courses of action; decide on the course of action that best accomplishes the mission; and produce an order for execution. The military decisionmaking process applies to both conceptual and detailed approaches. It is most closely associated with detailed planning.

4-17. For unfamiliar problems, executable solutions typically require integrating the Army design methodology with the military decisionmaking process. The military decisionmaking process helps leaders apply thoroughness, clarity, sound judgment, logic, and professional knowledge so they understand situations, develop options to solve problems, and reach decisions. This process helps commanders, staffs, and others to think critically and creatively while planning. (See ADRP 5-0 for more information on the military decisionmaking process.)

**TROOP LEADING PROCEDURES**

4-18. The troop leading procedures is a dynamic process used by small-unit leaders to analyze a mission, develop a plan, and prepare for an operation. Heavily weighted in favor of familiar problems and short planning periods, organizations with staffs typically do not employ troop leading procedures. More often, leaders use troop leading procedures to solve tactical problems when working alone or with a small group. For example, a company commander may use the executive officer, first sergeant, fire support officer, supply sergeant, and communications sergeant to assist during troop leading procedures. (See ADRP 5-0 for more information on troop leading procedures.)

**THE WARFIGHTING FUNCTIONS**

4-19. To execute operations, commanders conceptualize capabilities in terms of combat power. Combat power has eight elements: leadership, information, mission command, movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, and protection. The Army collectively describes the last six elements as warfighting functions. Commanders apply combat power through warfighting functions using leadership and information. (See chapter 5 for a discussion of combat power.)
ARMY OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK

4-20. Army leaders are responsible for clearly articulating their concept of operations in time, space, purpose, and resources. They do this through an operational framework and associated vocabulary. An operational framework is a cognitive tool used to assist commanders and staffs in clearly visualizing and describing the application of combat power in time, space, purpose, and resources in the concept of operations (ADP 1-01). An operational framework establishes an area of geographic and operational responsibility for the commander and provides a way to visualize how the commander will employ forces. To understand the framework is to understand the relationship between the area of operations and operations in depth. Proper relationships allow for simultaneous operations and the massing of effects against an enemy.

4-21. The operational framework has four components. First, commanders are assigned an area of operations for the conduct of operations. Second, a commander can designate deep, close, support, and consolidation areas to describe the physical arrangement of forces in time and space. Third, within these areas commanders conduct decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations to articulate the operation in terms of purpose. Finally, commanders designate the main and supporting efforts to designate the shifting prioritization of resources.

AREA OF OPERATIONS

4-22. An area of operations is an operational area defined by a commander for land and maritime forces that should be large enough to accomplish their missions and protect their forces (JP 3-0). For land operations, an area of operations includes subordinate areas of operations assigned by Army commanders to their subordinate echelons. In operations, commanders use control measures to assign responsibilities, coordinate fire and maneuver, and control combat operations. A control measure is a means of regulating forces or warfighting functions (ADRP 6-0). One of the most important control measures is the assigned area of operations. The Army commander or joint force land component commander is the supported commander within an area of operations designated by the JFC for land operations. Within their areas of operations, commanders integrate and synchronize combat power. To facilitate this integration and synchronization, commanders designate targeting priorities, effects, and timing within their areas of operations. Responsibilities within an assigned area of operations include—

- Terrain management.
- Information collection, integration, and synchronization.
- Civil affairs operations.
- Movement control.
- Clearance of fires.
- Security.
- Personnel recovery.
- Airspace control.
- Minimum-essential stability tasks.

4-23. Commanders consider a unit’s area of influence when assigning it an area of operations. An area of influence is a geographical area wherein a commander is directly capable of influencing operations by maneuver or fire support systems normally under the commander’s command or control (JP 3-0). Understanding the area of influence helps the commander and staff plan branches to the current operation in which the force uses capabilities outside the area of operations. An area of operations should not be substantially larger than the unit’s area of influence. Ideally, the area of influence would encompass the entire area of operations. An area of operations that is too large for a unit to control can allow sanctuaries for enemy forces and limit joint flexibility.

4-24. An area of interest is that area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence, areas adjacent thereto, and extending into enemy territory (JP 3-0). This area also includes areas occupied by enemy forces who could jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission. An area of interest for stability or DSCA tasks may be much larger than that area associated with the offense and defense. The area of interest always encompasses the aspects of the air, cyberspace and space domains since capabilities resident in all three enable operations on land.
4-25. Areas of operations may be contiguous or noncontiguous. When they are contiguous, a boundary separates them. (See figure 4-1.) When areas of operations are noncontiguous, subordinate commands do not share a boundary. The higher headquarters retains responsibility for the area not assigned to subordinate units. (See figure 4-2.)
**DEEP, CLOSE, SUPPORT, AND CONSOLIDATION AREAS**

4-26. A *deep area* is the portion of the commander’s area of operations that is not assigned to subordinate units. Operations in the deep area involve efforts to prevent uncommitted enemy forces from being committed in a coherent manner. A commander’s deep area generally extends beyond subordinate unit boundaries out to the limits of the commander’s designated area of operations. The purpose of operations in the deep area frequently ties to other events distant in time and space. Operations in the deep area might disrupt the movement of operational reserves or prevent the enemy from employing long-range fires. In an operational environment where the enemy recruits insurgents from a population, deep operations might focus on interfering with the recruiting process, disrupting the training of recruits, or eliminating the underlying factors that enable the enemy to recruit. Planning for operations in the deep area includes considerations for information collection, airspace control, joint fires, obstacle emplacement, maneuver (air and ground), special operations, and information operations.

4-27. The higher headquarters controls deep areas within its area of operations. In some instances, a deep area may focus along a single line of operation. In other instances, a deep area may focus along multiple lines of operations. The mission variables of METT-TC impacts methods leaders use to direct operations in a deep area.

4-28. The *close area* is the portion of a commander’s area of operations assigned to subordinate maneuver forces. Operations in the close area are within a subordinate commander’s area of operations. Commanders plan to conduct decisive operations using maneuver and fires in the close area, and they position most of the maneuver force within it. Within the close area, depending on the echelon, one unit may conduct the decisive operation while others conduct shaping operations. A close operation requires speed and mobility to rapidly concentrate overwhelming combat power at the critical time and place and to exploit success.

4-29. A *support area* is the portion of the commander’s area of operations that is designated to facilitate the positioning, employment, and protection of base sustainment assets required to sustain, enable, and control operations. Commanders assign a support area as a subordinate area of operations to support functions. It is where most of the echelon’s sustaining operations occur. Within a division or corps support area, a designated unit such as a brigade combat team or maneuver enhancement brigade provides area security, terrain management, movement control, mobility support, clearance of fires, and required tactical combat forces. This allows sustainment units to focus on their primary function.

4-30. The *consolidation area* is the portion of the commander’s area of operations that is designated to facilitate the security and stability tasks necessary for freedom of action in the close area and to support the continuous consolidation of gains. Commanders may establish a consolidation area, particularly in the offense as the friendly force gains territory, to exploit tactical success while enabling freedom of action for forces operating in the other areas. When designated, a consolidation area refers to an area of operations assigned to an organization that extends from its higher headquarters boundary to the boundary of forces in close operations. At this latter boundary, forces have established a level of control and large-scale combat operations have ceased.

4-31. The consolidation area does not necessarily need to surround—nor contain—the support area base clusters, but typically it does. It requires a purposefully task-organized, combined arms unit to conduct area security and stability tasks as well as employ and clear fires. This unencumbers units conducting close operations and enables the higher echelon headquarters to focus on close operations, deep operations, and future planning. The forces necessary to consolidate gains represent a separate and distinct requirement beyond the brigade combat teams and divisions required to conduct close and deep operations. To consolidate gains properly, the theater army plans and requests the additional required forces through the force tailoring process during the early stages of the conflict buildup.
DECISIVE, SHAPING, AND SUSTAINING OPERATIONS

4-32. Decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations lend themselves to a broad conceptual orientation. The decisive operation is the operation that directly accomplishes the mission. The decisive operation is the focal point around which commanders design an entire operation. The decisive operation is designed to determine the outcome of a major operation, battle, or engagement. Multiple subordinate units may be engaged in the same decisive operation across multiple domains. Decisive operations lead directly to the accomplishment of a commander’s intent.

4-33. A shaping operation is an operation that establishes conditions for the decisive operation through effects on the enemy, other actors, and the terrain. Information operations, for example, may integrate engagement tasks into the operation to reduce tensions between Army units and different ethnic groups. In combat, synchronizing the effects of aircraft, artillery fires, and obscurants to delay or disrupt repositioning forces illustrates shaping operations. Shaping operations may occur throughout the area of operations and involve any combination of forces and capabilities across multiple domains. Shaping operations set conditions for the success of the decisive operation. Commanders may designate more than one shaping operation.

4-34. A sustaining operation is an operation at any echelon that enables the decisive operation or shaping operations by generating and maintaining combat power. Sustaining operations focus internally on friendly forces while decisive and shaping operations focus externally on the enemy or environment. Sustaining operations include personnel and logistics support, support area security, movement control, terrain management, and infrastructure development.

4-35. Sustaining operations are inseparable from decisive and shaping operations. Sustaining operations occur throughout the area of operations, not just within a support area. Failure to sustain may result in mission failure. Sustaining operations determine how quickly Army forces reconstitute and how far Army forces can exploit success.

4-36. Throughout decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations, commanders and their staffs need to ensure that—

- Forces maintain positions of relative advantage.
- Operations are integrated with unified action partners.
- Continuity is maintained throughout operations.

Position of Relative Advantage

4-37. A position of relative advantage is a location or the establishment of a favorable condition within the area of operations that provides the commander with temporary freedom of action to enhance combat power over an enemy or influence the enemy to accept risk and move to a position of disadvantage. Positions of relative advantage may extend across multiple domains to provide opportunities for units to compel, persuade, or deter enemy decisions or actions. Commanders seek and create positions of advantage to exploit through action, and they continually assess friendly and enemy forces in relation to each other for opportunities to exploit. A key aspect in achieving a position of advantage is maneuver, which is the employment of forces in the operational area through movement in combination with fires to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy (JP 3-0).

4-38. Army forces must both recognize and exploit positions of relative advantage because they are generally temporary when faced with an adaptive enemy. Enemy forces will also be attempting to gain a position of advantage over friendly forces. Commanders and staffs analyze relative capabilities across all domains that can influence an operation. Significant advantages in another domain can significantly offset advantages in another.
Chapter 4

Integration

4-39. Army forces do not operate independently but as a part of a larger unified action during operations. Army leaders integrate Army capabilities within this larger effort. Commanders, assisted by their staffs, integrate numerous processes and activities within their formations and across the joint force. Integration involves efforts to operate with unified action partners and efforts to employ Army capabilities as part of the larger operational concept.

4-40. Army leaders use Army capabilities to complement those of their unified action partners. They also depend on partners’ capabilities to supplement Army capabilities. Effective integration requires staffs to create a shared understanding and purpose through collaboration with unified action partners.

Continuity

4-41. Decision making during operations is continuous; it is not a discrete event. Commanders carefully balance priorities between current and future operations. They seek to accomplish the mission effectively while conserving resources for future operations. To maintain continuity of operations, commanders and staffs establish branches and sequels that facilitate future operations.

4-42. Commanders only make changes to plans when necessary. This presents subordinates with the fewest possible changes and the most time to spend on their own planning and execution. The fewer the changes, the less planning needed, and the greater the chance that the changes will be executed successfully.

4-43. When possible, commanders should ensure that changes do not preclude options for future operations. Normally this applies only to higher echelons with organic planning capabilities. Staffs develop options during planning, or commanders infer them based on their assessment of the current situation. Developing or inferring options depends on validating earlier assumptions and updating planning factors and staff estimates. The concept of future operations may be war-gamed using updated planning factors, estimates, and assumptions.

Main and Supporting Efforts

4-44. Commanders designate main and supporting efforts to establish clear priorities of support and resources among subordinate units. The main effort is a designated subordinate unit whose mission at a given point in time is most critical to overall mission success. It is usually weighted with the preponderance of combat power. Typically, commanders shift the main effort one or more times during execution. Designating a main effort temporarily prioritizes resource allocation. When commanders designate a unit as the main effort, it receives priority of support and resources to maximize combat power. Commanders establish clear priorities of support, and they shift resources and priorities to the main effort as circumstances and the commander’s intent require. Commanders may designate a unit conducting a shaping operation as the main effort until the decisive operation commences. However, the unit with primary responsibility for the decisive operation then becomes the main effort upon the execution of the decisive operation.

4-45. A supporting effort is a designated subordinate unit with a mission that supports the success of the main effort. Commanders resource supporting efforts with the minimum assets necessary to accomplish the mission. Forces often realize success of the main effort through success of supporting efforts.
Chapter 5

Combat Power

This chapter discusses combat power. It first discusses the elements of combat power. The next section covers the six warfighting functions: mission command, movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, and protection. Lastly, the chapter discusses the means of organizing combat power.

THE ELEMENTS OF COMBAT POWER

5-1. *Combat power* is the total means of destructive, constructive, and information capabilities that a military unit or formation can apply at a given time. Operations executed through simultaneous offensive, defensive, stability, or DSCA tasks require the continuous generation and application of combat power. To an Army commander, Army forces generate combat power by converting potential into effective action. Combat power includes all capabilities provided by unified action partners that are integrated and synchronized with the commander’s objectives to achieve unity of effort in sustained operations.

5-2. To execute combined arms operations, commanders conceptualize capabilities in terms of combat power. Combat power has eight elements: leadership, information, mission command, movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, and protection. The elements facilitate Army forces accessing joint and multinational fires and assets. The Army collectively describes the last six elements as warfighting functions. Commanders apply combat power through the warfighting functions using leadership and information. (See figure 5-1.)

5-3. Generating and maintaining combat power throughout an operation is essential to success. Factors that contribute to generating and maintaining combat power include reserves, force rotation, network viability, access to cyberspace and space enablers, and joint support. Commanders balance the ability to mass lethal and nonlethal effects with the need to deploy and sustain the units that produce those effects. They balance the ability of accomplishing the mission with the ability to project and sustain the force.

5-4. Commanders apply leadership through mission command. Leadership is a multiplying and unifying element of combat power. The Army defines *leadership* as the process of influencing people by providing
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purpose, direction, and motivation to accomplish the mission and improve the organization (ADP 6-22). An Army commander, by virtue of assumed role or assigned responsibility, inspires and influences people to accomplish organizational goals. (See ADRP 6-22 for a detailed discussion of Army leadership.)

5-5. Information enables commanders at all levels to make informed decisions about the application of combat power and achieve definitive results. Knowledge management enables commanders to make informed, timely decisions under ambiguous and time-constrained conditions. Information management helps determine what among the vast amounts of information available is important. Information management uses procedures and information systems to facilitate collecting, processing, storing, displaying, disseminating, and protecting knowledge and information.

5-6. Commanders and their units must coordinate what they do, say, and portray. Fundamental to this coordination is the development of information themes and messages. An information theme is a unifying or dominant idea or image that expresses the purpose for military action. A message is a verbal, written, or electronic communication that supports an information theme focused on a specific actor and in support of a specific action. Themes and messages are tied to objectives, lines of effort, and end state conditions. Information themes are overarching and apply to capabilities of public affairs, military information support operations, and audience engagements. Commanders employ themes and messages as part of planned activities designed to influence specific foreign audiences in support current or planned operations.

5-7. Every operation involves cyberspace electromagnetic activities. **Cyberspace electromagnetic activities is the process of planning, integrating, and synchronizing cyberspace and electronic warfare operations in support of unified land operations.** (This is also known as CEMA.) **Cyberspace operations** is the employment of cyberspace capabilities where the primary purpose is to achieve objectives in or through cyberspace (JP 3-0). **Electronic warfare** is military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy (JP 3-13.1).

5-8. Army cyberspace and electronic warfare operations are conducted to seize, retain, and exploit advantages in cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum. These operations support decisive action through the conduct of six core missions: offensive cyberspace operations, defensive cyberspace operations, Department of Defense information network operations, electronic attack, electronic protection, and electronic warfare support. Commanders and staffs conduct cyberspace electromagnetic activities to project power in cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum; secure and defend friendly force networks; and protect personnel, facilities, and equipment. Spectrum management operations are a critical enabler of integrated cyberspace operations and electronic warfare. (See FM 3-12 for a discussion of cyberspace operations and electronic warfare.)

**THE SIX WARFIGHTING FUNCTIONS**

5-9. A **warfighting function** is a group of tasks and systems united by a common purpose that commanders use to accomplish missions and training objectives. Warfighting functions are the physical means that tactical commanders use to execute operations and accomplish missions assigned by superior tactical- and operational-level commanders. The purpose of warfighting functions is to provide an intellectual organization for common critical capabilities available to commanders and staffs at all echelons and levels of warfare. Commanders integrate and synchronize these capabilities with other warfighting functions to achieve objectives and accomplish missions.

5-10. All warfighting functions possess scalable capabilities to facilitate lethal and nonlethal effects. All the functions implement various systems such as personnel and networks to integrate forces and synchronize activities. Commanders should remember that cyber-related platforms that support integration and synchronization must be protected and defended. Combined arms operations use the capabilities of each function, along with leadership and information, in complementary and reinforcing capabilities.

**MISSION COMMAND WARFIGHTING FUNCTION**

5-11. The **mission command warfighting function** is the related tasks and systems that develop and integrate those activities enabling a commander to balance the art of command and the science of control in order to integrate the other warfighting functions. Commanders, assisted by staffs, integrate numerous processes and activities within the headquarters and across the force through mission command.
5-12. Mission command encourages the greatest possible freedom of action from subordinates. While the commander remains the central figure, mission command enables subordinates to develop situations through action without additional guidance. Mission command creates a shared understanding of an operational environment and the commander’s intent to establish the appropriate degree of control. Collaborative engagement among commanders, staffs, and unified action partners helps clarify the meaning of events or situations in their unique and continually evolving operational environment. Commanders, staffs, and unified action partners share information, knowledge, perceptions, and concepts, regardless of their physical locations.

5-13. The art of command is the creative and skillful exercise of authority through decision making and leadership. As commanders exercise the art of command, they—

- Drive the operations process through their activities of understanding, visualizing, describing, directing, leading, and assessing operations.
- Develop teams, both within their own organizations and with unified action partners.
- Inform and influence audiences, both inside and outside their organizations.
- Draw upon their experience, education, training, and available information to make decisions.

5-14. The commander directs the staff’s tasks using the science of control. The science of control consists of systems and procedures to improve the commander’s understanding and to support accomplishing missions. The four primary staff tasks are—

- Conduct the operations process: plan, prepare, execute, and assess.
- Conduct knowledge management, information management, and foreign disclosure.
- Conduct information operations.
- Conduct cyberspace electromagnetic activities.

5-15. In addition to mission command warfighting function tasks, six additional tasks reside within the mission command warfighting function. These tasks are—

- Conduct civil affairs operations.
- Conduct military deception.
- Install, operate, and maintain the Department of Defense information network.
- Conduct airspace control.
- Conduct information protection.
- Conduct space activities.

5-16. In addition to the principles of mission command in ADRP 6-0, commanders consider the following when performing mission command warfighting function tasks:

- Clear and established command and support relationships that are understood by commanders, staffs, and subordinate units facilitate the exercise of mission command.
- The commanders’ presence is vital to understanding commander’s intent and purpose.
- Effective collaboration enhances mission command by sharing knowledge and aiding the creation of shared understanding. This is especially true when sharing information with multinational partners through the foreign disclosure process.

(See ADRP 6-0 for an in-depth discussion of mission command.)

MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER WARFIGHTING FUNCTION

5-17. The movement and maneuver warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that move and employ forces to achieve a position of relative advantage over the enemy and other threats. Direct fire and close combat are inherent in maneuver. The movement and maneuver warfighting function includes tasks associated with force projection. Movement is necessary to disperse and displace the force as a whole or in part when maneuvering. Maneuver uses forces in the operational area through movement in combination with fires to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy. Commanders use maneuver for massing effects to achieve surprise, shock, and momentum. Effective maneuver requires close coordination of fires and movement. Both tactical and operational maneuver require sustainment support. The movement and maneuver warfighting function includes the following tasks:
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- Move.
- Maneuver.
- Employ direct fires.
- Occupy an area.
- Conduct mobility and countermobility.
- Conduct reconnaissance and surveillance.
- Employ battlefield obscuration.

5-18. The movement and maneuver warfighting function does not include administrative movements of personnel and materiel. Those movements fall under the sustainment warfighting function. (See ADRP 4-0 for a discussion of force projection.)

INTELLIGENCE WARFIGHTING FUNCTION

5-19. The **intelligence warfighting function** is the related tasks and systems that facilitate understanding the enemy, terrain, weather, civil considerations, and other significant aspects of the operational environment. Other significant aspects of an operational environment include threats, adversaries, and operational variables, which vary with the nature of operations. The intelligence warfighting function synchronizes information collection with primary tactical tasks of reconnaissance, surveillance, security, and intelligence operations. Intelligence is driven by commanders and involves analyzing information from all sources and conducting operations to develop the situation. The Army executes intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance through operations and intelligence processes, with an emphasis on intelligence analysis and information collection. The intelligence warfighting function includes the following tasks:

- Provide support to force generation.
- Provide support to situational understanding.
- Conduct information collection.
- Provide intelligence support to targeting and information capabilities.

5-20. The intelligence warfighting function executes the tasks needed to prepare intelligence support to all echelons deployed within a theater of operation. There are three core tasks. First, the staff establishes and builds an intelligence architecture. Second, the staff builds the knowledge base needed to understand an operational environment through coordination and collaboration with regionally aligned forces using the theater military intelligence brigade. Building the knowledge to understand an operational environment includes connecting the intelligence architecture to theater information systems. Last, the staff supports engagement, develops context, and builds relationships through the successful conduct of intelligence operations; intelligence analysis; and intelligence processing, exploitation, and dissemination. (See ADRP 2-0 for a discussion of the intelligence warfighting function and setting the theater.)

FIRES WARFIGHTING FUNCTION

5-21. The **fires warfighting function** is related tasks and systems that provide collective and coordinated use of Army indirect fires, air and missile defense, and joint fires through the targeting process. Army fires systems deliver fires in support of offensive and defensive tasks to create specific lethal and nonlethal effects on a target. The fires warfighting function includes the following tasks:

- Deliver fires.
- Integrate all forms of Army, joint, and multinational fires.
- Conduct targeting.

(See ADRP 3-09 for a discussion of the fires warfighting function.)

5-22. In addition to the characteristics for effective fires in ADRP 3-09, commanders consider the following when performing fires warfighting function tasks:

- The desired effect, available capabilities, time, and resources required to deliver the appropriate capability.
- Successful integration of information operations into the targeting process.
SUSTAINMENT WARFIGHTING FUNCTION

5-23. The sustainment warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that provide support and services to ensure freedom of action, extend operational reach, and prolong endurance. The endurance of Army forces is primarily a function of sustainment, which determines the depth and duration of Army operations. Sustainment is essential to retaining and exploiting the initiative and provides the support necessary to continue operations until mission accomplishment. The sustainment warfighting function includes the following tasks:

- Conduct logistics.
- Provide personnel services.
- Provide health service support.

Logistics

5-24. Logistics is planning and executing the movement and support of forces. It includes those aspects of military operations that—

- Design, develop, acquire, store, move, distribute, maintain, evacuate, and dispose of materiel.
- Acquire or build, maintain, operate, and dispose of facilities.
- Acquire or furnish services.

5-25. Logistics involves both military art and science. Knowing when and how to accept risk, prioritizing among competing requirements, and balancing limited resources all require military art. Logistics integrates strategic, operational, and tactical support of deployed forces while scheduling the mobilization and deployment of additional forces and materiel. Logistics includes—

- Maintenance.
- Transportation.
- Supply.
- Field services.
- Distribution.
- Operational contract support.
- General engineering support.

Personnel Services

5-26. Personnel services are those sustainment functions related to Soldiers’ welfare, readiness, and quality of life. Personnel services complement logistics by planning for and coordinating efforts that provide and sustain personnel. Personnel services include—

- Human resources support.
- Financial management.
- Legal support.
- Religious support.
- Army music support.

Health Service Support

5-27. The Army Health System is a component of the military health system that oversees operational management of the health service support and force health protection missions. The Army Health System includes all mission support services performed, provided, and arranged by the Army Medical Department to support health service support. It includes force health protection mission requirements for the Army. Health service support is part of the sustainment warfighting function, while force health protection is a part of the protection warfighting function.
5-28. The health service support mission improves, conserves, and restores the mental and physical well-being of Soldiers and, as directed, other personnel. It consists of casualty care, medical evacuation, and medical logistics. Casualty care encompasses the treatment aspects of a number of Army Medical Department functions including—

- Organic and area medical support.
- Hospitalization (including treatment of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear patients).
- Dental treatment.
- Behavioral health treatment.
- Clinical laboratory services.
- Medical evacuation (including in route care).
- Medical logistics (including blood and blood products).

5-29. Health service support closely relates to force health protection: the measures to promote, improve, or conserve the mental and physical well-being of Soldiers. These measures enable a healthy and fit force, prevent injury and illness, and protect the force from health hazards. (See ADRP 4-0 for a discussion of the sustainment warfighting function. See FM 4-02 for a discussion of the Army Health System. See FM 1-0 for a discussion of human resources support.)

5-30. In addition to the principles of sustainment in ADRP 4-0, commanders consider the following when performing sustainment warfighting function tasks:

- Acquisition of locations and facilities for force and logistic bases where temporary occupancy is planned or when the host nation fails to provide, or provides inadequate, locations and facilities.
- Sustainment forces, like all other forces, must be capable of self-defense, particularly if deployed alone or in advance of other military forces.

**PROTECTION WARFIGHTING FUNCTION**

5-31. The protection warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that preserve the force so the commander can apply maximum combat power to accomplish the mission. Preserving the force includes protecting personnel (combatants and noncombatants) and physical assets of the United States, unified action partners, and host nations. The protection warfighting function enables the commander to maintain the force’s integrity and combat power. Protection determines the degree to which potential threats can disrupt operations in order to counter or mitigate those threats before they can act. Protection is a continuing activity; it integrates all protection capabilities to safeguard bases, secure routes, and protect forces. Effective physical security measures, like any defensive measures, overlap and deploy in depth. Protection activities include maintaining the critical asset list and defended asset list.

5-32. The protection warfighting function includes the following tasks:

- Conduct survivability operations.
- Provide force health protection.
- Conduct chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear operations.
- Provide explosive ordnance disposal support.
- Coordinate air and missile defense.
- Conduct personnel recovery.
- Conduct detention operations.
- Conduct risk management.
- Implement physical security procedures.
- Apply antiterrorism measures.
- Conduct police operations.
- Conduct populace and resource control.

(See ADRP 3-37 for a discussion of the protection warfighting function.)
ORGANIZING COMBAT POWER

5-33. Commanders employ three means to organize combat power: force tailoring, task-organizing, and mutual support.

FORCE TAILORING

5-34. Force tailoring is the process of determining the right mix of forces and the sequence of their deployment in support of a joint force commander. It involves selecting the right force structure for a joint operation from available units within a combatant command or from the Army force pool. Commanders then sequence forces into the area of operations as part of force projection. JFCs request and receive forces for each campaign phase, adjusting the quantity of Service component forces to match the weight of effort. Army Service component commanders tailor forces to meet land force requirements as determined by JFCs. Army Service component commanders also recommend forces and a deployment sequence to meet those requirements. Force tailoring is continuous. As new forces rotate into the area of operations, forces with excess capabilities return to the supporting combatant and Army Service component commands.

TASK ORGANIZATION

5-35. Task-organizing is the act of designing a force, support staff, or sustainment package of specific size and composition to meet a unique task or mission. Characteristics to examine when task-organizing the force include, but are not limited to, training, experience, equipment, sustainability, operational environment, enemy threat, and mobility. Task-organizing includes allocating assets to subordinate commanders and establishing their command and support relationships. This occurs within tailored force packages as commanders organize subordinate units for specific missions and employ doctrinal command and support relationships. As task-organizing continues, commanders reorganize units for subsequent missions. The ability of Army forces to task-organize gives them extraordinary agility. It lets commanders configure their units to best use available resources. It also allows Army forces to match unit capabilities to tasks. The ability of sustainment forces to tailor and task-organize ensures commanders have freedom of action to change with mission requirements.

MUTUAL SUPPORT

5-36. Commanders consider mutual support when task-organizing forces, assigning areas of operations, and positioning units. Mutual support is that support which units render each other against an enemy, because of their assigned tasks, their position relative to each other and to the enemy, and their inherent capabilities (JP 3-31). Understanding mutual support and the time to accept risk during operations are fundamental to the art of tactics. In Army doctrine, mutual support is a planning consideration related to force disposition, not a command relationship. Mutual support has two aspects—supporting range and supporting distance. When friendly forces are static, supporting range equals supporting distance.

5-37. Supporting range is the distance one unit may be geographically separated from a second unit yet remain within the maximum range of the second unit’s weapons systems. It depends on available weapons systems and is normally the maximum range of the supporting unit’s indirect fire weapons. For small units (such as squads, sections, and platoons), it is the distance between two units that their direct fires can cover effectively. Visibility may limit the supporting range. If one unit cannot effectively or safely fire in support of another, the first may not be in supporting range even though its weapons have the required range.

5-38. Supporting distance is the distance between two units that can be traveled in time for one to come to the aid of the other and prevent its defeat by an enemy or ensure it regains control of a civil situation. The following factors affect supporting distance:

- Terrain and mobility.
- Distance.
- Enemy capabilities.
- Friendly capabilities.
- Reaction time.
5-39. The capabilities of supported and supporting units affect supporting distance. Units may be within supporting distance, but if the supported unit cannot communicate with the supporting unit, the supporting unit may not be able to affect the operation’s outcome. In such cases, the units are not within supporting distance regardless of their proximity to each other. If the units share a common operational picture, relative proximity may be less important than both units’ abilities to coordinate their maneuver and fires. To exploit the advantage of supporting distance, units synchronize maneuver and fires more effectively than the enemy does. Otherwise, the enemy may be able to defeat both units in detail.

5-40. Commanders consider the supporting distance in operations dominated by stability or DSCA tasks. Units maintain mutual support when one unit can draw on another unit’s capabilities. An interdependent joint force may make proximity less significant than available capability. For example, Air Force assets may be able to move a preventive medicine detachment from an intermediate staging base to an operational area threatened by an epidemic.

5-41. Conventional and special operations forces may operate in proximity to each other to accomplish the JFC’s mission. These two forces assist and complement each other with mutual support so they can achieve an objective that otherwise might not be attainable. Extended or large-scale operations involving both conventional and special operations forces require the integration and synchronization of conventional and special operations efforts. The joint task force commander must consider the different capabilities and limitations of both conventional and special operations forces, particularly in the areas of tactical mission command and sustainment. Exchanging liaison elements between conventional and special operations staffs further integrates efforts of all forces concerned. (For more information on coordinating conventional and special operations forces, see FM 6-05.)

5-42. Improved access to joint capabilities gives commanders additional means to achieve mutual support. Those capabilities can extend the operating distances between Army units. Army commanders can substitute joint capabilities for mutual support between subordinate forces. Using joint capabilities multiplies supporting distance many times over. Army forces can then extend operational reach over greater areas at a higher tempo. Joint capabilities are especially useful when subordinate units operate in noncontiguous areas of operations that place units beyond a supporting range or supporting distance. However, depending on joint capabilities outside an Army commander’s direct control entails accepting risk when the enemy can control multiple domains.
Glossary

The glossary lists acronyms and terms with Army or joint definitions. Where Army and joint definitions differ, (Army) precedes the definition. The glossary lists terms for which ADRP 3-0 is the proponent with an asterisk (*) before the term. For other terms, it lists the proponent publication in parentheses after the definition.

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<td>field manual</td>
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<td>METT-TC</td>
<td>mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations</td>
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SECTION II – TERMS

adversary
A party acknowledged as potentially hostile to a friendly party and against which the use of force may be envisaged. (JP 3-0)

airspace control
Capabilities and procedures used to increase operational effectiveness by promoting the safe, efficient, and flexible use of airspace. (JP 3-52)

alliance
The relationship that results from a formal agreement between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives that further the common interests of the members. (JP 3-0)

area of influence
A geographical area wherein a commander is directly capable of influencing operations by maneuver or fire support systems normally under the commander’s command or control. (JP 3-0)

area of interest
That area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence, areas adjacent thereto, and extending into enemy territory. (JP 3-0)

area of operations
An operational area defined by a commander for land and maritime forces that should be large enough to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. (JP 3-0)
Army design methodology
A methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe problems and approaches to solving them. (ADP 5-0)

assessment
Determination of the progress toward accomplishing a task, creating a condition, or achieving an objective. (JP 3-0)

base
A locality from which operations are projected or supported. (JP 4-0)

campaign
A series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space. (JP 5-0)

center of gravity
The source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act. (JP 5-0)

*close area
The portion of a commander’s area of operations assigned to subordinate maneuver forces.

*close combat
That part of warfare carried out on land in a direct-fire fight, supported by direct and indirect fires and other assets.

*combat power
(Army) The total means of destructive, constructive, and information capabilities that a military unit or formation can apply at a given time.

*combined arms
The synchronized and simultaneous application of all elements of combat power that together achieve an effect greater than if each element was used separately or sequentially.

commander’s intent
A clear and concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the desired military end state that supports mission command, provides focus to the staff, and helps subordinate and supporting commanders act to achieve the commander’s desired results without further orders, even when the operation does not unfold as planned. (JP 3-0)

concept of operations
A verbal or graphic statement that clearly and concisely expresses what the joint force commander intends to accomplish and how it will be done using available resources. (JP 5-0)

*consolidate gains
Activities to make enduring any temporary operational success and set the conditions for a stable environment allowing for a transition of control to legitimate authorities.

*consolidation area
The portion of the commander’s area of operations that is designated to facilitate the security and stability tasks necessary for freedom of action in the close area and to support the continuous consolidation of gains.

control measure
A means of regulating forces or warfighting functions. (ADRP 6-0)

culminating point
The point at which a force no longer has the capability to continue its form of operations, offense or defense. (JP 5-0)
*cyberspace electromagnetic activities*

The process of planning, integrating, and synchronizing cyberspace and electronic warfare operations in support of unified land operations.

*cyberspace operations*

The employment of cyberspace capabilities where the primary purpose is to achieve objectives in or through cyberspace. (JP 3-0)

*decisive action*

The continuous, simultaneous combinations of offensive, defensive, and stability or defense support of civil authorities tasks.

*decisive operation*

The operation that directly accomplishes the mission.

*decisive point*

A geographic place, specific key event, critical factor, or function that, when acted upon, allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an enemy or contribute materially to achieving success. (JP 5-0)

*deep area*

The portion of the commander’s area of operations that is not assigned to subordinate units.

*defeat mechanism*

A method through which friendly forces accomplish their mission against enemy opposition.

*defense support of civil authorities*

Support provided by United States Federal military forces, Department of Defense civilians, Department of Defense contract personnel, Department of Defense component assets, and National Guard forces (when the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the governors of the affected states, elects and requests to use those forces in Title 32, United States Code, status) in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic activities, or from qualifying entities for special events. (DODD 3025.18)

*defensive task*

A task conducted to defeat an enemy attack, gain time, economize forces, and develop conditions favorable for offensive or stability tasks.

*depth*

The extension of operations in time, space, or purpose to achieve definitive results.

*destroy*

A tactical mission task that physically renders an enemy force combat-ineffective until it is reconstituted. Alternatively, to destroy a combat system is to damage it so badly that it cannot perform any function or be restored to a usable condition without being entirely rebuilt. (FM 3-90-1)

*disintegrate*

To disrupt the enemy’s command and control system, degrading its ability to conduct operations while leading to a rapid collapse of the enemy’s capabilities or will to fight.

*dislocate*

To employ forces to obtain significant positional advantage, rendering the enemy’s dispositions less valuable, perhaps even irrelevant.

*electronic warfare*

Military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy. (JP 3-13.1)

*end state*

The set of required conditions that defines achievement of the commander’s objectives. (JP 3-0)
*enemy
A party identified as hostile against which the use of force is authorized.

*exterior lines
Lines on which a force operates when its operations converge on the enemy.

*fires warfighting function
The related tasks and systems that provide collective and coordinated use of Army indirect fires, air and missile defense, and joint fires through the targeting process.

*flexibility
The employment of a versatile mix of capabilities, formations, and equipment for conducting operations.

*force tailoring
The process of determining the right mix of forces and the sequence of their deployment in support of a joint force commander.

foreign internal defense
Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security. (JP 3-22)

forward operating base
An airfield used to support tactical operations without establishing full support facilities. (JP 3-09.3)

hazard
A condition with the potential to cause injury, illness, or death of personnel; damage to or loss of equipment or property; or mission degradation. (JP 3-33)

homeland defense
The protection of United States sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical infrastructure against external threats and aggression or other threats as directed by the President. (JP 3-27)

*hybrid threat
The diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, terrorist forces, or criminal elements unified to achieve mutually benefitting threat effects.

information collection
An activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and employment of sensors and assets as well as the processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations. (FM 3-55)

information environment
The aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information. (JP 3-13)

*intelligence warfighting function
The related tasks and systems that facilitate understanding the enemy, terrain, weather, civil considerations, and other significant aspects of the operational environment.

interagency coordination
Within the context of Department of Defense involvement, the coordination that occurs between elements of Department of Defense, and participating United States Government departments and agencies for the purpose of achieving an objective. (JP 3-0)

*interior lines
Lines on which a force operates when its operations diverge from a central point.
intermediate staging base
A tailorable, temporary location used for staging forces, sustainment and/or extraction into and out of an operational area. (JP 3-35)

interorganizational cooperation
The interaction that occurs among elements of the Department of Defense; participating United States Government departments and agencies; state, territorial, local, and tribal agencies; foreign military forces and government agencies; international organizations; nongovernmental organizations; and the private sector. (JP 3-08)

isolate
A tactical mission task that requires a unit to seal off—both physically and psychologically—an enemy from sources of support, deny the enemy freedom of movement, and prevent the isolated enemy force from having contact with other enemy forces. (FM 3-90-1)

joint force
A force composed of elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments operating under a single joint force commander. (JP 3-0)

joint operations
Military actions conducted by joint forces and those Service forces employed in specified command relationships with each other, which of themselves, do not establish joint forces. (JP 3-0)

*landpower
The ability—by threat, force, or occupation—to gain, sustain, and exploit control over land, resources, and people.

law of war
That part of international law that regulates the conduct of armed hostilities. (JP 1-04)

leadership
The process of influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation to accomplish the mission and improve the organization. (ADP 6-22)

*line of effort
(Army) A line that links multiple tasks using the logic of purpose rather than geographical reference to focus efforts toward establishing a desired end state.

*line of operations
(Army) A line that defines the directional orientation of a force in time and space in relation to the enemy and links the force with its base of operations and objectives.

lodgment
A designated area in a hostile or potentially hostile operational area that, when seized and held, makes the continuous landing of troops and materiel possible and provides maneuver space for subsequent operations. (JP 3-18)

*main effort
A designated subordinate unit whose mission at a given point in time is most critical to overall mission success.

major operation
A series of tactical actions (battles, engagements, strikes) conducted by combat forces, coordinated in time and place, to achieve strategic or operational objectives in an operational area. (JP 3-0)

maneuver
Employment of forces in the operational area through movement in combination with fires to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy. (JP 3-0)
mission command
(Army) The exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable
disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the
conduct of unified land operations. (ADP 6-0)

*mission command warfighting function
The related tasks and systems that develop and integrate those activities enabling a commander to
balance the art of command and the science of control in order to integrate the other warfighting
functions.

*movement and maneuver warfighting function
The related tasks and systems that move and employ forces to achieve a position of relative advantage
over the enemy and other threats.

multinational operations
A collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, usually
undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance. (JP 3-16)

mutual support
That support which units render each other against an enemy, because of their assigned tasks, their
position relative to each other and to the enemy, and their inherent capabilities. (JP 3-31)

nongovernmental organization
A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or
promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and
conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society.
(JP 3-08)

*offensive task
A task conducted to defeat and destroy enemy forces and seize terrain, resources, and population
centers.

operation
A sequence of tactical actions with a common purpose or unifying theme. (JP 1)

operational approach
A broad description of the mission, operational concepts, tasks, and actions required to accomplish the
mission. (JP 5-0)

operational art
The cognitive approach by commanders and staffs—supported by their skill, knowledge, experience,
creativity, and judgment—to develop strategies, campaigns, and operations to organize and employ
military forces by integrating ends, ways, and means. (JP 3-0)

operational concept
A fundamental statement that frames how Army forces, operating as part of a joint force, conduct
operations. (ADP 1-01)

operational environment
A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of
capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. (JP 3-0)

operational framework
A cognitive tool used to assist commanders and staffs in clearly visualizing and describing the
application of combat power in time, space, purpose, and resources in the concept of operations.
(ADP 1-01)
**operational reach**
The distance and duration across which a force can successfully employ military capabilities. (JP 3-0)

**phase**
(Army) A planning and execution tool used to divide an operation in duration or activity.

**planning**
The art and science of understanding a situation, envisioning a desired future, and laying out effective ways of bringing that future about. (ADP 5-0)

**position of relative advantage**
A location or the establishment of a favorable condition within the area of operations that provides the commander with temporary freedom of action to enhance combat power over an enemy or influence the enemy to accept risk and move to a position of disadvantage.

**principle**
A comprehensive and fundamental rule or an assumption of central importance that guides how an organization or function approaches and thinks about the conduct of operations. (ADP 1-01)

**protection**
Preservation of the effectiveness and survivability of mission-related military and nonmilitary personnel, equipment, facilities, information, and infrastructure deployed or located within or outside the boundaries of a given operational area. (JP 3-0)

**protection warfighting function**
The related tasks and systems that preserve the force so the commander can apply maximum combat power to accomplish the mission.

**rules of engagement**
Directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. (JP 1-04)

**security cooperation**
All Department of Defense interactions with foreign security establishments to build security relationships that promote specific United States security interests, develop allied and partner nation military and security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide United States forces with peacetime and contingency access to allied and partner nations. (JP 3-20)

**security force assistance**
The Department of Defense activities that support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions. (JP 3-20)

**security operations**
Those operations undertaken by a commander to provide early and accurate warning of enemy operations, to provide the force being protected with time and maneuver space within which to react to the enemy, and to develop the situation to allow the commander to effectively use the protected force. (ADRP 3-90)

**shaping operation**
An operation that establishes conditions for the decisive operation through effects on the enemy, other actors, and the terrain.

**simultaneity**
The execution of related and mutually supporting tasks at the same time across multiple locations and domains.

**stability mechanism**
The primary method through which friendly forces affect civilians in order to attain conditions that support establishing a lasting, stable peace.
stability tasks
Tasks conducted as part of operations outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. (ADRP 3-0)

*support area
The portion of the commander’s area of operations that is designated to facilitate the positioning, employment, and protection of base sustainment assets required to sustain, enable, and control operations.

*supporting distance
The distance between two units that can be traveled in time for one to come to the aid of the other and prevent its defeat by an enemy or ensure it regains control of a civil situation.

*supporting effort
A designated subordinate unit with a mission that supports the success of the main effort.

*supporting range
The distance one unit may be geographically separated from a second unit yet remain within the maximum range of the second unit’s weapons systems.

*sustaining operation
An operation at any echelon that enables the decisive operation or shaping operations by generating and maintaining combat power.

*sustainment warfighting function
The related tasks and systems that provide support and services to ensure freedom of action, extend operational reach, and prolong endurance.

synchronization
The arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive place and time. (JP 2-0)

*task-organizing
The act of designing a force, support staff, or sustainment package of specific size and composition to meet a unique task or mission.

*tempo
The relative speed and rhythm of military operations over time with respect to the enemy.

tenets of operations
Desirable attributes that should be built into all plans and operations and are directly related to the Army’s operational concept. (ADP 1-01)

terrain management
The process of allocating terrain by establishing areas of operation, designating assembly areas, and specifying locations for units and activities to deconflict activities that might interfere with each other. (ADRP 5-0)

*threat
Any combination of actors, entities, or forces that have the capability and intent to harm United States forces, United States national interests, or the homeland.

unified action
The synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort. (JP 1)

*unified action partners
Those military forces, governmental and nongovernmental organizations, and elements of the private sector with whom Army forces plan, coordinate, synchronize, and integrate during the conduct of operations.
**unified land operations**
Simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability or defense support of civil authorities tasks to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative to shape the operational environment, prevent conflict, consolidate gains, and win our Nation’s wars as part of unified action.

**unity of effort**
Coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization, which is the product of successful unified action. (JP 1)

**warfighting function**
A group of tasks and systems united by a common purpose that commanders use to accomplish missions and training objectives.
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